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The computational treatment of cryptography, and indeed any scientific treat-
ment of a problem, is marked by its definitional side and by it constructive side.
Results in this thesis better our understanding of both: on one side, they characterize
the extent to which computational definitions capture the security of the basic task
of symmetric encryption; on the other, they provide explicit bounds on the efficiency
of commitment and secure two-party computation constructions. Specifically:
• We relate the formal and computational treatments of symmetric encryption, ob-
taining a precise characterization of computational schemes whose computational
semantics imply their formal semantics. We prove that this characterization is
strictly weaker than previously-identified notions, and show how it may be realized
in a simpler, more efficient manner.
• We provide lower-bounds on the number of times a one-way permutation needs
to be invoked (as a “black-box”) in order to construct statistically-binding com-
mitments. Our bounds are tight for the case of perfectly-binding schemes.
• We show that the secure computation of any two-party functionality can be per-
formed in an optimal two rounds of communication even in a setting that accounts
for concurrent execution with other protocols (i.e., the Universal Composability
framework). Here, we rely on the assumption that parties have access to a com-
mon reference string; some sort of setup is known to be necessary.
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Things derive their being and nature
by mutual dependence
and are nothing in themselves.
Acharya Nagarjuna, second century
The last three decades have seen cryptography approached from a computational-
centric perspective. On the definitional side, the hallmark of the approach has
been assuming little about the adversarial entity attacking the system beyond its
computational abilities. In particular, definitions do not seek to address specific
strategies that an adversary may employ (within the setting it is allowed to oper-
ate in); this is a desirable formulation, as an adversary will typically attempt to
behave in a manner that was not envisioned during the design of the system. Sym-
metric encryption is a salient example — semantic security [GM84] requires that
no probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm be able to distinguish an encryption of
one message from an encryption of another with more than negligible probability
of success. On the constructive side, modern solutions rely on, and indeed require,
the ability to generate instances of problems that hard for computationally-bounded
algorithms. Turning again to our example, we know that the existence of one-way
functions — functions that are easy to compute but hard to invert for probabilistic,
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polynomial-time algorithms — is sufficient [BM84, GGM86, GL89, HILL99], and
necessary [IL89], for constructing semantically-secure encryption schemes.
In examining the computational approach, it is important to consider the
following questions:
• Definitions: How well do definitions capture the intended security goals?
• Constructions: Does the approach entail any inherent limitations on con-
structions that satisfy these definitions? If so, can we build protocols that
match these limitations?
This thesis presents advances on both fronts. Towards one end, we look outside the
framework and relate computational definitions with their counterparts in an alter-
native, prominent framework. Towards the other end, we look inside the framework
and derive bounds on the efficiency of basic constructions. Below, we provide an
informal, comprehensive account of our contributions.
1.1 What the Definitions Capture: Relating the Formal and Com-
putational Treatments of Symmetric Encryption
A typical computational treatment [BDJR97, BKR00, BR93, BM84, GMW87,
GM84, GMR88, Yao82] models cryptographic operations (or participants in a cryp-
tographic protocol) as efficient algorithms on strings of bits. Security, as mentioned
above, is defined in terms of probabilities of successful attacks by computationally-
bounded adversaries. Such treatment offers concrete procedures for the notions it
2
models and provides quantitative guarantees of security; it is, however, typically
complex to model and argue in.
Cryptographic notions have received alternative treatments, the most promi-
nent of which has been the formal one. Here, a typical treatment [AG99, BAN89,
DY83, GM95, Kem89, KMM94, Low96, Mea91, MCF87, MMS97, Pau98, THG99]
features a formal language, in which statements, representing cryptographic enti-
ties and operations, can be made. The security properties of these statements are
usually asserted outside the language, or expressed as syntactic properties of the
statements. The formal treatment is abstract, simple and lends itself promptly to
automated analysis; it does not, however, offer concrete instantiations of the cryp-
tographic notions it models. (Obviously, the lists of references mentioned above are
not exhaustive.)
A significant effort has recently been made to relate the two approaches. To-
wards this end, researchers have been seeking conditions under which computational
notions can be “plugged in” instead of the corresponding formal notions while pre-
serving the formal semantics; and, conversely, conditions under which formal notions
can abstract computational notions such that the computational semantics is main-
tained. For one, this offers a direct means of seeing what aspects of the underlying
natural concern were captured in each treatment, shedding light on our topic of
interest here. In addition, a central motivation has been the promise of bringing
the strengths of one treatment to the other. Specifically, a successful endeavor is
expected to confirm and increase the relevance of formal proofs to concrete compu-
tational instantiations; and allow the application of the high level formal reasoning
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mechanisms to the computational domain.
Related Work. Relating the formal and computational treatments of cryptography
has been a thriving research area in recent years. Initial steps were taken by Abadi
and Rogaway [AR02], building on the work of Aabadi and Jurgens [AJ01]; both deal
with sufficient conditions under which formal semantics for symmetric encryption
implies the computational semantics. Micciancio and Warinschi [MW04a] give a
sufficient condition for the converse. Abadi and Warinschi [AW05] extend that work
to relate the treatments of password-based encryption. Note that all the above deal
with security notions in which the adversary plays a passive role.
A second line of research focuses on notions in which the adversary plays
an active role. Micciancio and Warinschi [MW04b] formalize a setting in which the
treatments of such notions can be related, and give a sufficient condition under which
a symbolic notion of mutual authentication implies a computational one. Canetti
and Herzog [CH04] lift these results to the Universal-Composability framework of
Canetti [Can01], and deal additionally with the notion of key-exchange. Backes
and Pfitzmann [BP05] relate formal and computational notions of secrecy in an
equivalent framework of their design. Micciancio and Panjwani [MP05] extend the
theorem of [AR02] to account for particular active cases and apply it to relate a
formal treatment of multicast key-distribution with a computational one.
4
1.1.1 Our Contributions
We focus on relating the formal and computational treatments of symmetric
encryption, completing the characterization initiated by Abadi and Rogaway [AR02].
We begin by reviewing their model and result, using a running example for intuition.
Consider a language of formal expressions, where expressions are built from
symbols that represent bits and keys using symbolic operands that represent pairing
and encryption. For example, the expression E1 = (K1, {0}K2) represents the pair-
ing of key K1 with an encryption of the bit 0 with key K2. Two semantics are now
defined. In the first, an expression is associated with a syntactic counterpart, the
pattern, which mirrors the expression up to parts that should look “unintelligible”
to an observer; informally, these are parts, defined in syntactic terms, that represent
encryptions with keys that are not recoverable from the expression. In our example,
E1 will be mapped to the pattern E1 = (K1,2), where 2 represents an “unintelligi-
ble” part. Expressions are said to be equivalent in this setting if their patterns are
equal as strings of symbols (up to a consistent renaming of the key symbols). For
example, E1 will be equivalent to E2 = (K8, {(1, 1)}K9). This constitutes a formal
semantics. In the second definition, an expression is associated with an ensemble
of distributions on strings, obtained by instantiating the key symbols and encryp-
tion operations occurring in the expression with the corresponding components of
a concrete computational encryption scheme (for all security parameters). Two ex-
pressions are said to be indistinguishable in this setting if their associated ensembles
are computationally indistinguishable. This constitutes a computational semantics.
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Within this setup, [AR02] give a soundness result: they show that under
specific, sufficient conditions on the computational encryption scheme, equivalence
of expressions (in the formal semantics) implies their indistinguishability (in the
computational semantics). Our work tightly characterizes the completeness aspect
of this exposition. We identify the following notion:
Definition 1.1.1 (The admittance of WKA-EXP tests for expressions - informal).
We say that a computational encryption scheme admits a weak key-authenticity test
for expressions E1, E2 if there exists an efficient algorithm that distinguishes:
• an encryption of an instantiation of E1, paired with the key used to perform
the encryption; from
• an encryption of an instantiation of E2, paired with a random key,
with a non-negligible probability (as a function of the security parameter used for
the encryption scheme). Say that the scheme admits weak key-authenticity tests for
expressions if it admits a weak key-authenticity test for all expressions E1, E2. ♦
As our main result, we show that:
Theorem 1.1.2 (Admittance of WKA-EXP tests is necessary and sufficient for
formal encryption to be computationally-complete - informal). The admittance of
weak key-authenticity tests is necessary and sufficient for indistinguishability of ex-
pressions (in the computational semantics) to imply their equivalence (in the formal
semantics).
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In proving this result, we provide a novel fixpoint characterization of the syntactic
notion of “intelligible” parts of formal expressions.
Prior to our result, a property of encryption schemes dubbed confusion-freeness
was suggested as sufficient for completeness [AJ01, MW04a]. Roughly speaking, a
confusion-free scheme is one in which the decryption of a ciphertext with a wrong
key fails with almost certainty. The above-mentioned work suggests the use of a full-
fledged authenticated encryption scheme [BN00, KY00] to provide for this property.
As our second result, we show that:
Theorem 1.1.3 (Admittance of WKA-EXP is strictly weaker than related notions -
informal). The requirement that an encryption scheme admits weak key-authenticity
tests for expressions is strictly weaker than the requirement that it be confusion-free
(and certainly weaker than the requirement that it be an authenticated encryption
scheme).
To that effect, we consider a strengthened version of our condition, requiring
the admittance of a single, universal weak key-authenticity test (as opposed to one
per pair of expressions), defined in strict computational terms (i.e., independent of
expressions from the formal language). We say that an encryption scheme admits
a weak key authenticity test if it satisfies this strengthened condition. We present
a simple encryption scheme that admits a weak key-authenticity test but is not
confusion-free. The scheme thus matches our completeness criterion, but not that
of [MW04a]. Furthermore, it meets the soundness criterion of [AR02].
A preliminary version of this work appeared in [HG03].
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1.2 Efficiency of Constructions: Bounds for Generic Commitments
Modern cryptography has had substantial success in identifying the mini-
mal hardness assumptions needed for the construction of various cryptographic
tools and protocols. We now know, for example, that one-way functions are nec-
essary [IL89, Rom90] and sufficient for the construction of pseudorandom gener-
ators (PRGs) [BM84, Yao82, GL89, HILL99], universal one-way hash functions
(UOWHFs) and digital signature schemes [NY89, Rom90], private-key encryption
schemes [GGM84], and commitment schemes [Nao91]. It is the case, unfortunately,
that all of the constructions just referenced are notoriously inefficient, and no con-
structions (based on one-way functions) improving upon the efficiency of these so-
lutions are known. On the other hand, more efficient constructions are known to
exist under stronger (e.g., number-theoretic) assumptions.
The apparent tradeoff between the efficiency of a construction and the un-
derlying hardness assumption used to prove it secure has prompted a recent line
of research aimed at answering the following question: how efficient can construc-
tions based on minimal assumptions be? One way to formalize this question is to
look at so-called “black-box” constructions which use an underlying primitive (e.g.,
a one-way permutation) only as an oracle, and which do not use, e.g., an explicit
circuit computing the primitive in question (see Section 1.2.1 for further discus-
sion). The idea of studying cryptographic constructions in this way was initiated
by Impagliazzo and Rudich [IR89, Rud88] in the context of proving the impos-
sibility of certain constructions, and much additional work in this vein followed
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[Rud91, Sim98, GKM+00, GMR01, Fis02]. (See [RTV04] for rigorous formal defi-
nitions of the Impagliazzo-Rudich model, as well as some variants that have been
used.) Kim, Simon, and Tetali [KST99] were the first to use this model as a means
of studying the efficiency of constructions (rather than their feasibility), with effi-
ciency measured in terms of the number of oracle calls made by the construction.
They show non-tight bounds on the efficiency of constructing UOWHFs from one-
way permutations. Extending their results, Gennaro, et al. [GGKT05] show that
known constructions of UOWHFs based on one-way permutations are in fact opti-
mal; they also show efficiency bounds for the case of PRGs, private-key encryption
schemes, and digital signatures based on one-way permutations, as well as for the
case of public-key encryption schemes based on trapdoor permutations.
Before describing our contributions, we provide a brief overview of the Impagliazzo-
Rudich model and black-box lower bounds. (The following is adapted from [GGKT05],
including only what is directly relevant to the present work. For a more general dis-
cussion, see [GGKT05, RTV04].)
1.2.1 Black-Box Lower Bounds
At the most general level, a construction of a commitment scheme based on
one-way permutations may be viewed as a procedure P which takes as input (a
description of) a permutation π and outputs (a description of) two circuits (S,R)
(here, S represents the sender while R represents the receiver ; see Section 1.2.2
and Section 3.1.2) realizing the desired commitment functionality whenever π is a
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permutation. If the construction is black-box, this means that P relies only on the
input/output behavior of π and not on any internal structure of the implementa-
tion of π; formally, this means that the construction can be described as a pair of
oracle procedures (S(·),R(·)) such that (Sπ,Rπ) realizes the desired functionality of
a commitment scheme for any permutation π.
Besides achieving some desired functionality, a construction of a commitment
scheme should also be “secure” in some sense. There are various ways this can be
formalized (see [RTV04]); we will be interested here in weak black-box constructions
which offer the following guarantee:
If π is a one-way permutation, then the scheme (Sπ,Rπ) is “secure”
against all efficient adversaries (who are not given oracle access to π),
where “secure” in the above refers to some appropriately-defined notions of hiding
and binding. The distinction between whether an adversary is given oracle access
to π or not is important since the above should hold even when π is not efficiently
computable (and so the only way for an efficient adversary to evaluate π, in general,
may be via oracle access to π). Note, however, that a weak black-box construction
suffices to give implementations with meaningful security guarantees in the real
world: in this case, π will be efficiently-computable and furthermore an explicit
circuit for π will be known; hence, it is irrelevant whether an adversary is given oracle
access to π or not. Note also that weak black-box constructions are the weakest type
of black-box construction considered in [RTV04], and hence impossibility results for
weak black-box constructions rule out other black-box constructions as well.
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Although most currently-known constructions are black-box, it is important
to recognize that a number of non-black-box constructions do exist. As an ex-
ample, all known constructions of public-key encryption schemes secure against
chosen-ciphertext attacks based on trapdoor permutations (e.g., [DDN00]) are non
black-box. (See [GGKT05] for additional examples.) Nevertheless, a black-box im-
possibility result is useful in that it indicates the techniques necessary to achieve a
particular result. Furthermore, known non-black-box constructions are much less
efficient than black-box ones, and so a black-box impossibility result can be said to
rule out “practical” constructions.
1.2.2 Our Contributions
With the above in mind, we may now describe our results in fairly formal terms.
An interactive commitment scheme for m-bit messages is a pair of procedures (S,R)
which operates in two phases. In the commitment phase, the sender S takes as input
a message M ∈ {0, 1}m and interacts with the receiver R; we will refer to the view
of R at the conclusion of this phase as a commitment to M . In the decommitment
phase, the sender forwards a decommitment to R which, in particular, reveals M .
Without loss of generality, we will assume that the decommitment simply consists
of M along with the random coins used by S during the commitment phase.
A commitment scheme should guarantee both hiding and binding, where in-
formally these mean that (1) the receiver should have no information about M at
the end of the commitment phase while (2) the sender should be committed to a
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unique message at the end of that phase. More formally, a commitment scheme is
statistically-binding if it satisfies the following:
Hiding: For any M,M ′ ∈ {0, 1}m, the distribution over commitments (by the honest
sender S) to M is computationally indistinguishable from the distribution
over commitments (by S) to M ′, even when S interacts with a malicious (but
computationally bounded) receiver R∗.
(Statistical) binding: The probability (over coin tosses of the honest receiverR) that
there exist distinct M,M ′ and coins s, s′ for S such that the corresponding
commitments to M,M ′ are identical is at most εb. When εb = 0 we say the
scheme is perfectly binding.
Note that the formulation of the binding requirement ensures security even against
an all-powerful sender. Our definition of the binding requirement is somewhat
stronger than the usual one which, roughly speaking, requires only that a computationally-
unbounded sender without knowledge of r be unable to find distinct M,M ′ and coins
s, s′ such that the corresponding commitments are identical (except with some prob-
ability εb). For the case of two-round, public-coin schemes (where the receiver simply
sends a random string and the sender responds with a commitment) and perfectly-
binding schemes, however, the notions are identical. Looking ahead, we remark that
all the constructions we show in Section 3.3 satisfy the strong definition of binding
given above.
Say a permutation π : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n is one-way with security S if any
circuit of size at most S inverts π on at most a fraction 1/S of its inputs. Our main
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result may be stated as follows:
Theorem 1.2.1 (Bounds on the efficiency of generic, statistically-binding commit-
ments - informal). Any weak black-box construction of a statistically-binding com-
mitment scheme based on a one-way permutation with security S requires
Ω ((m− log(1 + 2m · εb))/ logS)
invocations of the permutation (by the sender and receiver combined for statistically-
binding schemes, and by the sender alone for perfectly-binding schemes).
Formally, we show that any construction beating this bound would imply the
unconditional existence of a statistically-binding commitment scheme; or, put an-
other way, the only way to develop a more efficient construction of a commitment
scheme based on one-way permutations is to construct a commitment scheme from
scratch. Note further that the existence of a commitment scheme implies the exis-
tence of one-way functions (and hence P 6= NP), and so in particular any black-box
construction beating our bound would also imply a proof that P 6= NP . We remark
that beyond the technical ideas used in our proof, our bound is interesting as the
first example of an efficiency bound on a protocol which protects against malicious
participants (the cryptographic primitives considered in [KST99, GGKT05] only in-
volve honest participants, with the adversary being a “passive observer”; indeed,
proving bounds for the case of commitment schemes was left as an explicit open
question there).
For perfectly-binding schemes, our bound translates to Ω(m/ logS); our bound
in this case matches the efficiency achieved by the construction of Blum [Blu82], in-
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stantiated using the Goldreich-Levin hard-core bits of a one-way permutation [GL89].
This is discussed further in Section 3.3, where we also compare our bounds to known
constructions of statistically-binding schemes.
We remark that (a natural adaptation of) our bounds applies also to construc-
tions of commitment schemes based on oracle access to trapdoor permutations (see
[GGKT05] for definitions). For ease of exposition, however, we prefer to work with
one-way permutations.
A preliminary version of this work appeared in [HK05].
1.3 Efficiency of Constructions: Universally Composable Two-Party
Computation in Two Rounds
Round complexity is an important measure of efficiency for cryptographic pro-
tocols, and much research has focused on trying to characterize the round complexity
of various tasks such as zero knowledge [GK96a, GK96b], concurrent zero knowledge
[CKPR01, PRS02], Byzantine agreement [PSL80, FL82, FM97, GM98], Verifiable
Secret-Sharing [GIKR01, FGG+06], and secure two-party/multi-party computation
[Yao86, BMR90, IK00, Lin01, GIKR02, KOS03, KO04]. (Needless to say, this list is
not exhaustive.) We focus on the goal of secure two-party computation. Feasibility
results in this case are clearly of theoretical importance, both in their own right and
because two-party computation may be viewed as the “base case” for secure compu-
tation without honest majority. Results in this case are also of potential practical
importance since many interesting cryptographic problems (zero knowledge, com-
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mitment, and — as we will see — blind signatures) can be solved by casting them
as specific instances of secure two-party computation.
The round complexity of secure two-party computation in the stand-alone
setting has been studied extensively. Yao [Yao86] gave the first constant-round
protocol for the case when parties are assumed to be honest-but-curious. Goldreich,
Micali, and Wigderson [GMW87, Gol04] showed how to obtain a protocol tolerating
malicious adversaries; however, their protocol does not run in a constant number of
rounds. Lindell [Lin01] gave the first constant-round protocol for secure two-party
computation in the presence of malicious adversaries. Katz and Ostrovsky [KO04]
showed a five-round protocol for malicious adversaries, and proved a lower bound
showing that five rounds are necessary. (The lower bound applies to black-box
proofs of security, and assumes parties communicate in alternate rounds.) Two-
round protocols for secure two-party computation, where only a single player receives
output, are studied in [SYY99, CCKM00]; in particular, Cachin et al. [CCKM00]
show a two-round protocol for computing arbitrary, single-output functionalities
assuming a common reference string (CRS) available to all participating parties.
It is by now well known that protocols secure when run in a stand-alone set-
ting may no longer be secure when many copies of the protocol are run concurrently
in an arbitrary manner (possibly among different parties), or when run alongside
other protocols in a larger network. To address this issue, researchers have pro-
posed models and definitions that would guarantee security in exactly such settings
[PW00, Can01]. In this work, we adopt the model of universal composability (UC)
introduced by Canetti [Can01].
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The initial work of Canetti showed broad feasibility results for UC multi-
party secure computation in the presence of a strict majority of honest players.
Unfortunately, subsequent work of Canetti and Fischlin [CF01] showed that even for
the case of two parties, one of whom may be malicious, there exist functionalities that
cannot be securely computed within the UC framework; further characterization of
all such “impossible-to-realize” two-party functionalities is given by [CKL06]. These
impossibility results hold for the “plain” model; in contrast, it is known that these
negative results can be bypassed if one is willing to assume some sort of “trusted
setup” on which all parties can rely. Various forms of trusted setup have been
explored [CF01, BCNP04, HMQU05, CDPW07, Katz07], the most common of which
is the availability of a CRS to all parties in the network. Under this assumption,
universally composable multi-party computation of any (well-formed) functionality
is possible for any number of corrupted parties [CLOS02].
The round complexity of UC two-party computation has not been explored in
detail. The two-party protocol given in [CLOS02] does not run in a constant number
of rounds, though this may be due at least in part to the fact that the goal of their
work was security under adaptive corruptions (where corruptions may happen at
any point during the execution of the protocol, and not necessarily at its outset, as
is the case with passive corruptions). Indeed, it is a long-standing open question to
construct a constant-round protocol for adaptively-secure two-party computation
even in the stand-alone setting. Jarecki and Shmatikov [JS07] recently showed a
four-round protocol, assuming a CRS, for functionalities that generate output for
only one of the parties; they also show a two-round protocol in the random oracle
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model. Using a standard transformation [Gol04], their protocols can be used to
compute two-output functionalities at the cost of an additional round.
1.3.1 Our Contributions
As our main result here, we show the following:
Theorem 1.3.1 (UC two-party computation in two-rounds - informal). UC compu-
tation of any (well-formed) two-party functionality (where both parties may receive
output) can be realized in only two rounds of communication, assuming static cor-
ruptions and the availability of a CRS to all participating parties.
In our work, we allow both parties to simultaneously send a message in any
given round (i.e., when both parties are honest), but prove security against a rushing
adversary who may observe the other party’s message in a given round before sending
his own. Although this communication model is non-standard in the two-party
setting, it matches the convention used in the study of multi-party protocols and
allows for a more accurate characterization of the round complexity. Our result holds
under any one of various standard number-theoretic assumptions, and does not rely
on random oracles. We assume a CRS but, as we have seen, some form of setup is
necessary for two-party computation to be possible (in any number of rounds). We
consider static corruptions only; again, recall that even in the stand-alone setting it
is not known how to achieve adaptive security in constant rounds.
We achieve our result via the following steps:
• We first show a two-round protocol (where only one party speaks in each
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round) for secure computation of any single-output functionality. This proto-
col is similar to that of Cachin et al. [CCKM00], though our protocol is secure
in the UC framework. The protocol relies on Yao’s “garbled circuit” tech-
nique [Yao86], the two-round oblivious transfer protocol of Tauman [Tau05],
and the non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs of De Santis et al. [DDO+01].
Using standard techniques [Gol04, Propositions 7.2.11 and 7.4.4], this imme-
diately implies a three-round protocol (where only one party speaks in each
round) for any two-output functionality.
• As our main result, we show how two instances of our initial protocol can
be run “in parallel” so as to obtain a two-round protocol (where now both
parties speak1 in each round) even if both parties are to receive output. The
challenging aspect of this step is to “bind” the two executions to ensure that
each party enters both executions with a consistent input.
It is not hard to see that one-round secure computation, even if both parties
are allowed to speak simultaneously, is impossible under any reasonable definition
of security and regardless of any global setup assumption; a similar observation
holds for two-round protocols when parties speak in alternate rounds. Thus, inter-
estingly, the round complexity of our protocols is optimal for any setting of secure
computation and not “just” for the setting of universal composability with a CRS.
The low round complexity of our protocols implies round-efficient solutions
for various cryptographic tasks. To give a timely example, we show that blind sig-
1We stress again that our security analysis takes into account a rushing adversary.
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natures [Cha82] can be reduced to secure computation of a particular functionality
(here, we simplify the prior result of [JLO97] to the same effect); thus, as almost an
immediate corollary of our result we obtain a two-round blind signature protocol,
matching a recent result by Fischlin [Fis06] via what is arguably a more intuitive con-
struction. Our result also has certain technical advantages as compared to Fischlin’s
work: our scheme can be applied to any underlying signature scheme and achieves
strong unforgeability “for free” (as long as the underlying signature scheme does);
in contrast, Fischlin’s result applies to a specific signature scheme of his design and
achieves strong unforgeability only with significant additional complications. On
the other hand, Fishlin’s result holds under more general assumptions.
As a second example, we observe that the evaluation of a trust policy, held
by a server, on a set of credentials, held by a client, can be cast as an instance
of two-party computation. Applying our protocol yields a solution that provides
input privacy to both the client and the server in a minimal number of rounds
while preserving security under general composition, a combination of traits not
present in current solutions (e.g., [BHS04, LDB03, NT05, LL06, BMC06, FAL06]
and references therein).
A preliminary version of this work is to appear in [HK07].
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Chapter 2
Relating the Formal and Computational Treatments of Symmetric
Encryption
Here, we relate the formal and computational treatments of cryptography, as
outlined in Section 1.1. The chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.1, we de-
scribe the formal treatment of symmetric encryption, and provide a new procedural
characterization of the formal semantics, to be used in the proof of our main theorem.
In Section 2.2, we describe the computational treatment. In Section 2.3, we provide
a necessary and sufficient condition for the computational semantics to imply the
formal one. In Section 2.4, we demonstrate that our condition is strictly weaker
than previously-suggested conditions, and present a simple, efficient construction.
2.1 Formal Treatment of Symmetric Encryption
Here, we present the formal view of symmetric encryption, most closely follow-
ing its formalization in [AR02]. The view consists of a formal language and a formal
semantics. Expressions in the formal language are built from symbols representing
bits and keys, using operands that represent pairing and encryption. Formal seman-
tics is defined in terms of equivalence of expressions, where equivalence is, in loose
terms, syntactic identity up to parts representing encryptions with keys that cannot
be recovered from expressions; we call such parts “unreachable”. Our definitions
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recast those of [AR02] in terms that pertain closely to the syntactic structure of
expressions. In addition, we provide a fixpoint characterization of the “reachable
parts” of expressions that plays an important role in the proof of our main theorem.
2.1.1 Formal Language
2.1.1.1 Expressions
Let Bits be the set {0, 1}; we call 0, 1 bits. Let Keys be a fixed, non-empty
set of symbols, disjoint from Bits; call the elements of Keys keys. Our formal
language consists of the set Exp, defined inductively as follows:
1. (Atomic elements or Atoms:) Bits,Keys ⊆ Exp.
2. (Non-Atomic elements:)
(a) (The Pairing Rule:) If M,N ∈ Exp then (M,N) ∈ Exp. We say that
(M,N) is directly derived from M and N .
(b) (The Encryption Rule:) If M ∈ Exp and K ∈ Keys, then {M}K ∈
Exp. We say that {M}K is directly derived from M .
Elements of Exp are called expressions. We refer to the pairing and the encryption
rules as derivation rules. Informally and as expected, (M,N) represents the pairing
of expressions M and N , while {M}K represents the encryption of expression M
with key K.
Expressions are strings of symbols. The length of an expression E, denoted
|E|, is the number of symbols it is comprised of (count ‘}K ’ as a single symbol).
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We use E1 = E2 to denote that the expressions E1, E2 are identical as strings of
symbols.
It is important to note that every non-atomic expression belongs in Exp by
way of a unique derivation rule and a unique set of expressions it is derived from; we
say that expressions in Exp are uniquely readable to express this property. Formally,
we claim that for two non-atomic expressions E1 and E2, E1 = E2 if (and, clearly,
only if) either:
• E1 = (M1, N1), E2 = (M2, N2) and M1 = M2, N1 = N2; or
• E1 = {M1}K1 , E2 = {M2}K2 and M1 = M2, K1 = K2.
To see this, note first that non-atomic expressions always open and close with match-
ing brackets (be it a ‘(’,‘)’ pair or a ‘{’,‘}K ’ pair), and that expressions have an equal
number of opening and closing brackets; these properties can easily be shown by
induction on the structure of expressions. Also, note that only atomic expressions
have length 1, and that no expression is shorter. Let E1 = E2. As the expres-
sions are identical as strings of symbols, they have the same opening and closing
brackets, and so must be in Exp by way of the same derivation rule. Assume
E1 = (M1, N1) = (M2, N2) = E2 (the argument for E1 = {M1}K1 = {M2}K2 = E2
is similar). If M1 6= M2, then one, say M1, must be a proper prefix of the other.
As |M1| ≥ 1, |M2| > 1, and so M2 must be non-atomic. But a proper prefix of a
non-atomic expression, which closes with a bracket, does not have a balanced num-
ber of brackets and thus cannot be an expression—a contradiction. It follows that
M1 = M2; similarly, N1 = N2.
22
2.1.1.2 Derivation Trees
The structure of an expression can be represented naturally in the form of a
tree. A derivation tree TE for an expression E is defined inductively as follows:
1. If E is atomic, then TE consists of a single node, the root, labeled E.
2. If E is non-atomic, then TE consists of a single node, the root, labeled E, and
an ordered list of trees for the expressions from which E is directly derived;
the sets of nodes of these trees are disjoint, and none contains the root of TE.
If E = (M,N), we say that TM and TN are the left and right subtrees of TE,
respectively. The roots of TM and TN are said to be the left and right children
of the root of TE, respectively. Similarly, if E = {M}K then TM is said to be
the subtree of TE; the root of TM is said to be the child of the root of TE.
Informally, the notion of a derivation tree resembles that of the standard parse tree;
the two relate in that a node in a derivation tree is labeled with the yield of the
corresponding node in the parse tree. We let |TE| denote the cardinality of the set
of nodes of TE.
We mention two properties of expressions and their derivation trees that are
relevant to our treatment. First, two expressions are identical as strings of symbols
iff their respective derivation trees are identical. For the only if part, argue induc-
tively on the structure of expressions and rely on the unique-readability property of
expressions; for the if part, argue inductively on the structure of derivation trees.
Second, if |E| = n, then TE consists of at most n nodes; this can be shown by
induction on the length of expressions.
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2.1.1.3 Acyclic Expressions
We consider expressions that contain no encryption cycles, following [AR02].
Say that a key K appears in plain in an expression E if there exists a node in TE
labeled K. We say that the key K1 encrypts key K2 in E if there exists a node v
labeled T{M}K1 in TE (for some expression M) and there exists a node labeled K2 is a
subtree of v. This induces a relation on the keys that appear in plain in E, henceforth
the “encrypts” relation. An expression E is said to be acyclic (respectively, cyclic) if
its associated “encrypts” relation contains no cycles (respectively, contains cycles).
2.1.2 Formal Semantics
The semantics for a formal language involving the encryption operation aims at
capturing privacy guarantees one expects the operation to provide. In particular, the
semantics seeks to express our understanding that parts of expressions, representing
encryptions with keys that are not recoverable from the text, should be unintelligible
(or unreachable) to a viewer. Second, it seeks to capture the understanding that
expressions, differing only in their unintelligible parts, should “look the same” to
a viewer. This is done by mapping each expression to a syntactic counterpart, the
pattern, which mirrors only its reachable parts; and by defining the equivalence of
expressions in terms of the syntactic equality of their respective patterns (up to a
consistent renaming of reachable keys).
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2.1.2.1 Reachable Nodes
Let TE be the derivation tree of an expression E, let V be its node set and let
r ∈ V be its root. A set U ⊆ V is said to contain the reachable nodes of TE if:
1. r ∈ U .
2. For all u ∈ U ,
(a) if u is labeled with an expression of the form (M,N), then both the
children of u in TE (labeled M and N) are in U .
(b) if u is labeled with an expression of the form {M}K , and there exists a
u′ ∈ U labeled K, then the child of u in TE (labeled M) is in U .
For example, the node set V of a derivation tree TE for an expression E contains
the reachable nodes of TE.
For E ∈ Exp of length n, TE consists of at most n nodes, of which there are at
most 2n subsets. It follows that the number of sets containing the set of reachable
nodes of TE is finite. Let R be the intersection of all those sets. It is easy to show
that R itself contains the set of reachable nodes of TE; it is minimal in the sense
that it is contained in all such sets. We call R the set of reachable nodes of TE; we
call a node in R a reachable node. Informally, reachable nodes correspond to parts
of an expression that should be intelligible to a viewer.
Let TE be a derivation tree with root r and a set of reachable nodes R. The
graph induced by TE on R must be a tree rooted at r, and not a forest (otherwise,
let R′ be the set of nodes in the connected component that contains r; R′ is a set
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that contains the set of reachable nodes in TE, contradicting the minimality of R).
We call this tree the tree of reachable nodes, and use TRE to denote it.
2.1.2.2 Patterns
The definition of a pattern extends that of an expression with the addition of an
atomic symbol, 2. Informally, 2 will appear in parts of a pattern that correspond to
unintelligible parts of the associated expression. Formally, Let Pat be a set, defined
inductively as follows:
1. (Atomic elements or Atoms:) Bits,Keys, {2} ⊆ Pat.
2. (Non-Atomic elements:)
(a) (The Pairing Rule:) If M,N ∈ Pat then (M,N) ∈ Pat. We say that
(M,N) is directly derived from M and N .
(b) (The Encryption Rule:) If M ∈ Pat and K ∈ Keys, then {M}K ∈
Pat. We say that {M}K is directly derived from M .
We call the elements of Pat patterns. We define the length of a pattern and the
equality of patterns as strings of symbols in a similar manner to the respective
definitions for expressions. As there, we associate a derivation tree TP with each
pattern P , and can show that two patterns are identical as strings of symbols iff
their respective derivation trees are identical.
To map expressions to patterns via their respective derivation trees, we will
need an appropriate notion of tree isomorphism. Let T1, T2 be finite, rooted, ordered
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trees with node sets V1, V2 and roots r1 ∈ V1, r2 ∈ V2, respectively. T1, T2 are said
to be isomorphic as rooted, ordered trees if there exists a bijection ϕ : V1 → V2 such
that:
1. ϕ(r1) = r2.
2. For all v ∈ V1, (u1, . . . , uk) are the (ordered) children of v in T1 iff (ϕ(u1), . . . , ϕ(uk))
are the (ordered) children of ϕ(v) in T2.
ϕ is said to be an isomorphism of T1, T2 as rooted, ordered trees.
Let TE be the derivation tree of an expression E, VE its node set, R ⊆ VE
its set of reachable nodes, and TRE the tree of reachable nodes of E. Let TP be the
derivation tree of a pattern P , VP its node set. We say that expression E has a
pattern P if there exists a ϕ : R→ VP such that:
1. ϕ is an isomorphism of TRE , TP as rooted, ordered trees.
2. For all v ∈ R,
(a) if v is labeled with a bit, then ϕ(v) is labeled with an identical bit.
(b) if v is labeled with a key, then ϕ(v) is labeled with an identical key.
(c) if v is labeled (M,N), then ϕ(v) is labeled (M ′, N ′).
(d) if v is labeled {M}K and there exists a u ∈ R labeled K, then ϕ(v) is
labeled {M ′}K .
(e) if v is labeled {M}K and there does not exist a u ∈ R labeled K, then
ϕ(v) is labeled 2.
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The corresponding definition of [AR02] amounts to a walk of TRE and TP that enforces
the above constraints.
We note that the pattern P associated with each expression E is unique. To
see this, notice that the uniqueness of TE implies a unique set of reachable nodes R,
which implies a unique TRE ; T
R
E can then easily be shown to be mapped to a unique
TP under ϕ above, which, in turn, guarantees a unique P . The converse is not true,
however; every pattern has infinitely many expressions that are mapped to it.
2.1.2.3 Equivalence
We proceed with the notion of expression equivalence. Informally, we require
that the derivation trees of patterns corresponding to equivalent expressions be
isomorphic up to key renaming. For i ∈ {1, 2}, let Pi be the pattern of expression
Ei, with a derivation tree TPi over VPi . We say that E1 is equivalent to E2, and
write E1 ∼= E2, iff there exists a ϕ : VP1 → VP2 and a permutation σ on Keys such
that:
1. ϕ is an isomorphism of TP1 , TP2 as rooted, ordered trees.
2. For all v ∈ VP1 ,
(a) if v is labelled with a bit, then ϕ(v) is labeled with an identical bit.
(b) if v is labeled K, then ϕ(v) is labeled with σ(K).
(c) if v is labeled (M,N), then ϕ(v) is labeled (M ′, N ′).
(d) if v is labeled {M}K , then ϕ(v) is labeled {M ′}σ(K).
28
(e) if v is labeled 2, then ϕ(v) is labeled 2.
Composing the definition of the pattern associated with an expression with
the definition of expression equivalence, we obtain the following property of the
equivalence relation.
Claim 2.1.1. For i ∈ {1, 2}, let Ei be an expression with a derivation tree TEi, a set
of reachable nodes REi and an induced tree of reachable nodes T
REi
Ei
. Then E1 ∼= E2
iff there exist a ϕ : RE1 → RE2 and a permutation σ on Keys such that:






as rooted, ordered trees.
2. For all v ∈ RE1,
(a) if v is labeled with a bit, then ϕ(v) is labeled with an identical bit.
(b) if v is labeled K, then ϕ(v) is labeled with σ(K).
(c) if v is labeled (M,N), then ϕ(v) is labeled (M ′, N ′).
(d) if v is labeled {M}K and there exists a u ∈ RE1 labeled K, then ϕ(v) is
labeled {M ′}σ(K) and ϕ(u) is labeled σ(K).
(e) if v is labeled {M}K and there does not exist a u ∈ RE1 labeled K, then
ϕ(v) is labeled {M ′}K′ and there does not exist a u′ ∈ RE2 labeled K ′.
We sketch the (mostly technical) proof here. For i ∈ {1, 2}, let Pi be the pattern
of Ei, and let ϕi : REi → VPi be as in the definition of a pattern. For the only if
part, let ψ : VP1 → VP2 and σ a permutation on Keys, witness the equivalence
of E1, E2. Then ϕ
∗ : RE1 → RE2 such that ϕ∗(v) = ϕ−12 (ψ(ϕ1(v))) and σ∗ = σ
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are with properties as required in the claim. For the if part, let ϕ∗ : RE1 → RE2
and σ a permutation on Keys be with properties as specified in the claim. Then
ψ : VP1 → VP2 such that ψ(v) = ϕ2(ϕ∗(ϕ−11 (v))) and σ = σ∗ witness the equivalence
of E1, E2.
2.1.2.4 Properties captured by the formal semantics
We conclude with a brief discussion of some ramifications of the formal seman-
tics we have seen in this section. Our intention is twofold: to point out definitional
choices made in the formal setting, and to highlight aspects that need to be ad-
dressed in the computational setting as well. We observe that under the above
definitions, the encryption operator seeks to:
• “Preserve data privacy”, as seen in the equivalence {0}K ∼= {1}K . Informally,
a ciphertext conceals the underlying plaintext.
• “Conceal plaintext repetitions”, as seen in the equivalence ({0}K , {0}K) ∼=
({0}K , {1}K). Informally, an adversary, given two ciphertexts, cannot tell
whether their underlying plaintexts are identical or not.
• “Conceal key repetitions”, as seen in the equivalence ({0}K1 , {1}K1) ∼= ({0}K7 , {1}K8).
Informally, an adversary, given two ciphertexts, cannot tell whether they were
generated with the same encryption key or not.
• “Conceal plaintext length”, as seen in the equivalence {0}K ∼= {(0, (1, 0))}K .
Informally, the ciphertext conceals the length of the underlying plaintext.
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The definitions of the semantics can be modified to accommodate relaxations of
the above properties. For example, the semantics can be made sensitive to different
plaintext lengths, by introducing an atomic pattern symbol 2n for each size n and
modifying the definition of equivalence appropriately. We stress that the results
of [AR02] and ours can be modified to tolerate such changes.
2.1.3 A Fixpoint Characterization of the Set of Reachable Nodes
The set of reachable nodes of TE for some expression E was defined in Sec-
tion 2.1.2.1 in set-intersection terms. Here, we characterize that set in terms of the
least-fixpoint of an associated operator, OE. Moreover, we show that the fixpoint
can be computed by a applying the operator to its own output a number of times
at most |E|.
Let S be a finite set, and let 2S be the set of all subsets of S. A function O :
2S → 2S is said to be monotonic if for all A,B ∈ 2S, A ⊆ B implies O(A) ⊆ O(B).
A set A ⊆ 2S is said to be a fixpoint of O : 2S → 2S if O(A) = A; A is said to be
the least fixpoint of O if A is a fixpoint of O and for all fixpoints B of O, A ⊆ B.
The following is a weak form of a theorem due to Tarski [Tar55]. For a gen-
eral treatment of Lemma 2.1.2 and Lemma 2.1.3 see [Llo87, Section 1.5]; for an
interesting account of related results, see [LN84].
Lemma 2.1.2. Let S be a finite set, O : 2S → 2S a monotonic function. Then O
has a least fixpoint, denoted lfp(O). Furthermore,
lfp(O) =
⋂ {




Proof. Let A =
⋂ {
X|X ∈ 2S, O(X) ⊆ X
}
.
We first show that O(A) ⊆ A. Let X ∈ 2S be such that O(X) ⊆ X. Clearly
A ⊆ X. By the monotonicity of O, O(A) ⊆ O(X), and so O(A) ⊆ X. It follows
that O(A) ⊆
⋂ {
X|X ∈ 2S, O(X) ⊆ X
}
= A.
Next, we show that A ⊆ O(A). We just proved that O(A) ⊆ A. By the
monotonicity of O, O(O(A)) ⊆ O(A). Therefore O(A) ∈
{
X|X ∈ 2S, O(X) ⊆ X
}
.
By the definition of A, it follows that A ⊆ O(A).
Putting it all together, we conclude that A is a fixpoint of O.
Let B ∈ 2S be any fixpoint of O. Then B ∈
{
X|X ∈ 2S, O(X) ⊆ X
}
. By the
definition of A, it follows that A ⊆ B. A is thus the least fixpoint of O.
Let S be a finite set, O : 2S → 2S a monotonic function. The powers of O are
defined inductively as follows:
O0 = ∅
Oi = O(Oi−1) for all i ∈ N+
We give a characterization of lfp(O) in terms of the powers of O.
Lemma 2.1.3. Let S be a finite set, O : 2S → 2S a monotonic function. Then there
exists an i ≤ |S| such that for all j ≥ i, Oj = lfp(O).
Proof. First note that for all i,
Oi ⊆ lfp(O). (2.1)
This can be shown by induction: clearly, O0 = ∅ ⊆ lfp(O); as for the step, Oi =
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O(Oi−1) ⊆ O(lfp(O)) ⊆ lfp(O) by the induction hypothesis, the monotonicity of O,
and the definition of a fixpoint of O.
Next, observe that for all i,
Oi ⊆ Oi+1. (2.2)
This can be shown again by induction: O0 = ∅ ⊆ O1; Oi = O(Oi−1) ⊆ O(Oi) =
Oi+1, by the induction hypothesis and the monotonicity of O. Using this property,
we can now show that for all j ≥ i,
Oi ⊆ Oj. (2.3)
This, by induction on j: clearly, for j = i, Oi ⊆ Oj; furthermore, Oi ⊆ Oj−1 ⊆ Oj
by the induction hypothesis and Equation 2.2.
Now note that for all i,
if Oi = Oi+1, then Oi = lfp(O). (2.4)
To see this, observe that Oi is a fixpoint of O because Oi = Oi+1 = O(Oi), and so
lfp(O) ⊆ Oi by the definition of a least fixpoint. But by Equation 2.1 we know that
for all i, Oi ⊆ lfp(O). It follows that Oi = lfp(O).
Assume towards a contradiction that there does not exist an i, 0 ≤ i ≤ |S|,
such that Oi = Oi+1. Then we can use induction to show that for all 0 ≤ k ≤ |S|+1,∣∣Ok∣∣ ≥ k. For the base case, observe that |O0| = |∅| = 0. For the step, note that
Ok−1 6= Ok by our assumption, and that Ok−1 ⊆ Ok by Equation 2.2. It follows that∣∣Ok∣∣ ≥ ∣∣Ok−1∣∣ + 1. By the induction hypothesis, we have that ∣∣Ok−1∣∣ ≥ (k − 1),
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and so
∣∣Ok∣∣ ≥ k, completing the induction step. But then ∣∣O|S|+1∣∣ ≥ |S| + 1 — a
contradiction, as S contains only |S| elements.
We conclude that there exists an i, 0 ≤ i ≤ |S|, such that Oi = Oi+1. By Equa-
tion 2.4, we thus have that
Oi = lfp(O). (2.5)
Let j be such that j ≥ i. ThenOi ⊆ Oj ⊆ lfp(O) = Oi by Equation 2.3, Equation 2.1
and Equation 2.5, respectively. It follows that Oj = lfp(O).
Let E be an expression, TE its derivation tree over a set of nodes VE with a






(a) u = rE ; or
(b) ∃v ∈ A labeled (M,N) with a left child u in TE (labeled M); or
(c) ∃v ∈ A labeled (M,N) with a right child u in TE (labeled N); or
(d) ∃v ∈ A labeled {M}K with a child u in TE (labeled M)
and ∃w ∈ A labeled K.

It is easy to show that OE is monotonic over sets in 2
S. Furthermore, we have
the following:
Lemma 2.1.4. For all A ∈ 2VE , OE(A) ⊆ A iff A is a set that contains the set of
reachable nodes of TE.
Proof. Assume OE(A) ⊆ A. First observe that rE ∈ OE(A) ⊆ A, and so rE ∈ A.
Furthermore, if v ∈ A is labeled (M,N) and has a child u in TE, then u ∈ OE(A) ⊆
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A, and so u ∈ A. Similarly, if v ∈ A is labeled {M}K , has a child u in TE and
∃w ∈ A labeled K, then u ∈ OE(A) ⊆ A, and so u ∈ A. It follows that A is a set
that contains the set of reachable nodes of TE.
Conversely, assume A is such a set, and let u be an element of OE(A). Then
either:
• u = rE. Clearly u ∈ A.
• ∃v ∈ A labeled (M,N) with a child u in TE. As A contains the reachable
nodes of TE, u ∈ A.
• ∃v ∈ A labeled {M}K with a child u in TE, ∃w ∈ A labeled K. Again, A
contains the set of reachable nodes of TE, and so u ∈ A.
It follows that OE(A) ⊆ A.
Putting it all together:
Theorem 2.1.5 (A Fixpoint Characterization of the Set of Reachable Nodes). Let
E be an expression of length n, TE its derivation tree over VE, RE ⊆ VE the set of
reachable nodes. Then there exists an i ∈ N, 0 ≤ i ≤ n, such that for all j ≥ i,
OjE = lfp(OE) = RE.
Proof. Recall that |VE| ≤ n (see Section 2.1.1.2) and that OE : 2S → 2S is mono-
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A contains the set of
reachable nodes of TE




∣∣A ∈ 2VE , OE(A) ⊆ A} by lemma 2.1.4
= lfp(O) by lemma 2.1.2
= OjE by lemma 2.1.3,
for any j and some particular i such that 0 ≤ i ≤ |VE| ≤ n and j ≥ i.
2.2 Computational Treatment of Symmetric Encryption
Here, we overview the computational treatment of symmetric encryption, fol-
lowing the formalization in [AR02] (for ease of reading our results in the context of
theirs). We begin by defining a computational encryption scheme, discuss a relevant
notion of security, and review methods of achieving such a notion under standard as-
sumptions. We then define computational “instantiations” of expressions, obtained
by replacing keys and the encryption operator in expressions with their counterparts
from an encryption scheme. We define semantics in terms of the computational in-
distinguishability of the instantiated expressions. Our definition of computational
instantiations of expressions recasts that of [AR02] in terms of the derivation trees
of the expressions.
We remark that notions of computational indistinguishability defined in this
section and used in this chapter all consider probabilistic, polynomial-time adver-
saries. Contrast with indistinguishability by polynomial-sized circuit families, used
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in Chapter 3, and with indistinguishability by probabilistic, polynomial-time al-
gorithms taking non-uniform “advice”, used in Chapter 4; see discussion in Sec-
tion 4.1.1. Throughout this section, recall that a function ε : N→ R is negligible if
for every constant c ∈ N there exists an ηc ∈ N such that for all η ∈ N such that
η > ηc, ε(η) ≤ η−c.
2.2.1 Computational Encryption, Security and Tools
2.2.1.1 Encryption Schemes
Let {0, 1}∗ denote the set of all finite binary strings and let |x| denote the length
of x ∈ {0, 1}∗. An encryption scheme Π = (K, E ,D) with a security parameter η ∈ N
consists of three polynomial-time algorithms, as follows:
• K, the key generation algorithm, is a probabilistic algorithm that takes a se-
curity parameter η ∈ N (provided in unary—denoted by 1η) and returns a
key k ∈ {0, 1}∗. We write k R← K(1η), thinking of k as being drawn from
the probability distribution induced by K(1η) on {0, 1}∗. When used as a
set, we let K(1η) denote the support of that distribution. For ease of exposi-
tion, we make the simple assumption that K distributes keys decently, that is,
Pr[k, k′
R← K(1η) : k 6= k′] is non-negligible (as a function of η).
• E , the encryption algorithm, is a probabilistic algorithm that takes a key k ∈
K(1η) for some η ∈ N and a plaintext x ∈ {0, 1}∗ and returns a ciphertext
c ∈ {0, 1}∗∪{⊥}. As before, we write c R← Ek(x), thinking of c as being drawn
from the probability distribution induced by Ek(x) on {0, 1}∗. When used as
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a set, we let Ek(x) denote the support of that distribution.
It is common for encryption schemes to restrict the set of strings they are
willing to encrypt; having the encryption algorithm return ⊥ is intended to
allow capturing such restrictions. Call a plaintext x ∈ {0, 1}∗ restricted for
some η ∈ N if for all k ∈ K(1η), Ek(x) = {⊥}. Call x ∈ {0, 1}∗ unrestricted for
η ∈ N if for all k ∈ K(1η), Ek(x) 63 ⊥. We require that x is either restricted
or unrestricted for any given η. Use PlainΠ[η] to denote the set of unrestricted
plaintexts for any η ∈ N. We further require that for any η ∈ N, if x ∈ {0, 1}∗
is unrestricted for η, then all x′ ∈ {0, 1}∗ such that |x′| = |x| are unrestricted
for η.
In addition, we insist that the length of a ciphertext c ∈ Ek(x) depend only on
η and |x| when k ∈ K(1η), for any x and η.
• D, the decryption algorithm, is a deterministic algorithm that takes a key
k ∈ K(1η) for some η ∈ N and a ciphertext c ∈ {0, 1}∗ and returns some
x ∈ {0, 1}∗ ∪ {⊥}. We write x← Dk(c).
Having the decryption algorithm output ⊥ is intended to reflect a rejection of
the given ciphertext.
We require that Π be correct ; that is, for all η ∈ N, for all k ∈ K(1η) and for all
x ∈ PlainΠ[η], Dk(Ek(x)) = x.
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2.2.1.2 Type-0 Security
We consider a notion of security for symmetric encryption that is variation
on the standard notion of indistinguishability under chosen-plaintext attacks (IND-
CPA security, for short) of [GM84, BDJR97], following [AR02]. Informally, and
recalling our discussion of Section 2.1.2.4, the standard notion “preserves privacy”
and “conceals plaintext repetitions”, while the strengthened version “conceals key
repetitions” and “conceals message lengths” as well; the strengthening is necessary
for proving that the formal semantics is computationally sound (see [AR02] for
discussion).
Let Π = (K, E ,D) be an encryption scheme, η ∈ N a security parameter and
A an adversary with access to two oracles (denoted A(·),(·)). Define:
Adv0Π[η](A) = Pr[k, k
′ R← K(1η) : AEk(·),Ek′ (·)(1η) = 1]
− Pr[k R← K(1η) : AEk(0),Ek(0)(1η) = 1],
where Ek(·) is an oracle that returns c
R← Ek(m) on input m, and Ek(0) is an oracle
that returns c
R← Ek(0) on input m. We say that Π is Type-0 secure (or IND-CPA,
Key-repetition Concealing, Length Concealing secure) [AR02] if for every probabilis-
tic, polynomial-time adversary A, Adv0Π[η](A) is negligible (as a function of η).
2.2.1.3 Pseudorandom Function Families and Obtaining Type-0 Se-
curity
Let x
R← S denote the sampling of x from a set S under the uniform distri-
bution. Let η ∈ N, l, L be polynomials, Funcl(η)→L(η) the set of all functions from
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{0, 1}l(n) to {0, 1}L(n), F ⊆ Funcl(η)→L(η) a family of functions indexed by {0, 1}η,
and A an adversary with access to an oracle (denoted A(·)). Define:
AdvprfF [η](A) = Pr[k
R← {0, 1}η : AFk(·)(1η) = 1]
− Pr[f R← Funcl(η)→L(η) : Af(·)(1η) = 1],
where Fk(·) is an oracle that returns Fk(x) on input x, and f(·) is an oracle that
returns f(x) on input x. We say that F is pseudorandom [GGM86] if for every
probabilistic, polynomial time adversary A, AdvprfF [η](A) is negligible (as a function
of η).
Bellare et. al. [BDJR97] show that the CBC and CTR modes of encryption
with underlying pseudorandom function families are IND-CPA secure. For a de-
scription of how these results extend to achieve type-0 security, see [AR02].
2.2.2 Computational Semantics
Here, we define a computational semantics for the language of expressions
of Section 2.1.1. We first associate with each expression an ensemble of distributions
over bit-strings; each distribution is obtained by “instantiating” the expression with
keys and an encryption operation provided by a computational encryption scheme,
using a particular security parameter. We then define expression indistinguishability
in terms of the computational indistinguishability of the associated ensembles.
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2.2.2.1 Instantiating Expressions
Let E be an expression and let TE be its derivation tree over VE. Say that a key
K appears in E if there exists a node in TE labeled K or {M}K (for some expression
M). Let KeysE be the set of key symbols appearing in E. Let Π = (K, E ,D) be an
encryption scheme with a security parameter η ∈ N. For x1, . . . , xk ∈ {0, 1}∗ and a
tag t from some finite, fixed set of tags, let 〈x1, . . . , xk, t〉 denote an (arbitrary, fixed,
unambiguous, polynomial-time) encoding of x1, . . . , xk, t as a string over {0, 1}∗.
Define the following procedure:
SampleΠ[η](E)
1. For each K ∈ KeysE, let τ(K)
R← K(1η).
2. Assign a sampling label to each v ∈ VE, inductively, as follows:
(a) If v is labeled with a bit b, let its sampling label be 〈b, “bit”〉.
(b) If v is labeled with a key K, let its sampling label be 〈τ(K), “key”〉.
(c) If v is labeled (M,N), its left child in TE has a sampling label m and its
right child in TE has a sampling label n, then let the sampling label of v
be 〈m,n, “pair”〉 if m,n 6= ⊥, ⊥ otherwise.
(d) If v is labeled {M}K and its child in TE has a sampling label m, then let
the sampling label of v be 〈Eτ(K)(m), “ciphertext”〉 ifm 6= ⊥, ⊥ otherwise.
3. Output the sampling label of the root of TE.
Let [[E]]Π(η) denote the probability distribution induced by SampleΠ[η](E) on




η∈N. We write x
R← D to indicate
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that x is sampled from a distributionD. To make our forthcoming definitions robust,
we require that Π is such that for every expression E, there exists an ηE ∈ N such
that for all η ≥ ηE and e
R← [[E]]Π(η), e ∈ PlainΠ[η].
2.2.2.2 Indistinguishability
For i ∈ {1, 2}, let Di = {Di(η)}η∈N be probability distribution ensembles, A
an algorithm. Define:
AdvindD1(η),D2(η)(A) = Pr[x
R← D1(η) : A(1η, x) = 1]
− Pr[x R← D2(η) : A(1η, x) = 1].
We say that D1, D2 are indistinguishable, and write D1
c
≈ D2, if for every probabilis-
tic, polynomial time algorithm A, AdvindD1(η),D2(η)(A) is negligible (as a function of η).
(Once again, see Section 4.1.1 for comparison with notions of indistinguishability
used in the other chapters.)
Let E1, E2 be expressions. We say that E1, E2 are indistinguishable, and write
E1
Π
≈ E2, iff [[E1]]Π
c
≈ [[E2]]Π.
2.3 Relating the Treatments – Formal Encryption is Computation-
ally Complete
The soundness result of Abadi and Rogaway states that for acyclic expressions
E1, E2 and a Type-0 encryption scheme Π, E1 ∼= E2 implies E1
Π
≈ E2. Here, we give a
necessary and sufficient condition for the converse, thereby tightly characterizing the
completeness aspect of the exposition. For any two acyclic expressions, the condition
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involves the admittance of an efficient test that distinguishes a ciphertext and the
key it was encrypted with, from a ciphertext and some random key, with a non-
negligible probability, when the plaintexts are drawn from the ensembles associated
with those expressions. Formally:
Definition 2.3.1 (Weak Key-Authenticity Test/s for Expressions). Let Π = (K, E ,D)
be an encryption scheme with a security parameter η ∈ N, let E1, E2 be acyclic ex-




R← K(1η); c R← Ek(e) : A(1η, c, k) = 1]
− Pr[e R← [[E2]]Π(η); k, k′
R← K(1η); c R← Ek(e) : A(1η, c, k′) = 1].
We say that Π admits a weak key-authenticity test for E1, E2 (WKA-EXP-(E1, E2)
test, for short), if there exists a probabilistic, polynomial-time algorithm A such
that Advwka-expΠ[η],E1,E2(A) is non-negligible (as a function of η).
We say that Π admits weak key-authenticity tests for expressions (WKA-EXP
tests, for short), if for all acyclic expressions E1 and E2, Π admits a weak key-
authenticity test for E1, E2. ♦
Our main result is the following:
Theorem 2.3.2 (The admittance of WKA-EXP tests is necessary and sufficient
for formal encryption to be computationally-complete). Let Π = (K, E ,D) be an
encryption scheme. Then for all acyclic expressions E1 and E2, E1
Π
≈ E2 implies
E1 ∼= E2 iff Π admits weak key-authenticity tests for expressions.
We proceed with the proof below.
43
2.3.1 Admittance of WKA-EXP Tests is Necessary for Formal En-
cryption to be Computationally-Complete
Here, we prove the only-if part of Theorem 2.3.2. Let E1, E2 be two acyclic ex-
pressions. Consider the expressions M1 = ({E1}K , K), M2 = ({E2}K , K ′) (without
loss of generality, assume K does not appear in E1, E2). M1 6∼= M2, so by the com-
pleteness assumption, we have thatM1 6
Π
≈M2. LetB be such that Advind[[M1]]Π(η),[[M2]]Π(η)(B)
is non-negligible. We use B to construct a WKA-EXP-(E1, E2) test A for Π. Define:
A(1η, c, k)
def





R← K(1η); c R← Ek(e) : A(1η, c, k) = 1]
− Pr[e R← [[E2]]Π(η); k, k′
R← K(1η); c R← Ek(e) : A(1η, c, k′) = 1]
= Pr












R← [[({E1}K , K)]]Π(η) : B(1η, e) = 1]
− Pr[e R← [[({E2}K , K ′)]]Π(η) : B(1η, e) = 1]
= Pr[e
R← [[M1]]Π(η) : B(1η, e) = 1]− Pr[e
R← [[M2]]Π(η) : B(1η, e) = 1]
= Advind[[M1]]Π(η),[[M2]]Π(η)(B),
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where the second equality follows from the definition of A, and the third follows
from the definition of SampleΠ[η]. Then A is a weak key-authenticity test for E1, E2,
as required. This completes the necessity part of the proof.
2.3.2 Admittance of WKA-EXP Tests is Sufficient for Formal En-
cryption to be Computationally-Complete
Here, we prove the if part of Theorem 2.3.2. For j ∈ {1, 2}, let Ej be an acyclic




the tree of reachable nodes. Let η ∈ N be a security parameter
for Π and let e be a sample from either [[E1]]Π(η) or [[E2]]Π(η). We assume that η is
large enough so that e ∈ PlainΠ[η] (cf. Section 2.2.2.1). Let S = VE1 × VE2 × {0, 1}
∗
and let OE1,E2,e : 2
S → 2S, TEST : 2S → {true, false} be defined as in Figure 2.1.





) for all i ∈ N+
We note the following simple properties of OE1,E2,e and TEST. It is easy to ver-
ify that OE1,E2,e is monotonic. Also, observe that for all i, O
i
E1,E2,e
⊆ Oi+1E1,E2,e, by in-







) = Oi+1E1,E2,e, by the hypothesis and the monotonicity of OE1,E2,e. Fi-
nally, note that for all A,B ∈ 2S such that A ⊆ B, if TEST(B) holds then TEST(A)
holds; it is also true that if TEST(A) does not hold, then TEST(B) does not hold.






We begin by sketching the main ideas behind the proof. Assume E1 6∼= E2. To
show that [[E1]]Π(η) 6
c
≈ [[E2]]Π(η), we consider an algorithm that simultaneously parses
its input e — a sample from either [[E1]]Π(η) or [[E2]]Π(η) — and expressions E1, E2,
attempting to construct ϕ, σ that bear witness to the equivalence of the expressions.
By the assumption, this attempt is bound to fail. We show that upon failure, the
algorithm has enough parsed information to predict the origin of the sample with a
non-negligible probability of success. In some cases, the prediction depends on an
application of a weak key-authenticity test for (particular, fixed) expressions to the
amassed information.
Specifically, the algorithm computes the powers of the operator OE1,E2,e, as
long as they satisfy the predicate TEST. Let i ∈ N. Let V iE1 =
{
v1




∣∣(·, v2, ·) ∈ OiE1,E2,e }. Let j ∈ {1, 2}. Let T V iEjEj denote the subtree in-
duced by V iEj on TEj . Let OEj be the operator from the fixpoint characterization
of the set of reachable nodes of TEj (cf. Theorem 2.1.5). We show that as long as
TEST(OiE1,E2,e) holds, it is the case that:
1. V i+1E1 = O
i+1
E1











, V iE1 , and V
i
E2
(instead of TRE1 , T
R
E2
, RE1 , and RE2).







(a) u1 = rE1 , u2 = rE2 , y = e; or
(b) ∃(v1, v2, x) ∈ A such that:
v1 is labeled (M,N) and has a left child u1 in TE1 ,
v2 is labeled (M ′, N ′) and has a left child u2 in TE2
and x is of the form 〈y, z, “pair”〉; or
(c) ∃(v1, v2, x) ∈ A such that:
v1 is labeled (M,N) and has a right child u1 in TE1 ,
v2 is labeled (M ′, N ′) and has a right child u2 in TE2
and x is of the form 〈y, z, “pair”〉; or
(d) ∃(v1, v2, x) ∈ A and ∃(w1, w2, z) ∈ A such that:
v1 is labeled {M}K and has a child u1 in TE1 ,
v2 is labeled {M ′}K′ and has a child u2 in TE2 ,
x is of the form 〈c, “ciphertext”〉,
w1 is labeled K,
w2 is labeled K ′,
z is of the form 〈k, “key”〉
and y = Dk(c).

TEST(A) =
true if for all (v1, v2, x) ∈ A, either:
(a) v1 is labeled with b ∈ Bits and v2 is labeled b; or
(b) v1 is labeled K, v2 is labeled K ′ and for all (u1, u2, y) ∈ A,
u1 is labeled K iff u2 is labeled K ′; or
(c) v1 is labeled (M,N) and v2 is labeled (M ′, N ′); or
(d) v1 is labeled {M}K , v2 is labeled {M ′}K′ and for all
(u1, u2, y) ∈ A, u1 is labeled K iff u2 is labeled K ′.
false otherwise.
Figure 2.1: Definitions of OE1,E2,e : 2
S → 2S, TEST : 2S → {true, false} .
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achieve the sets of reachable nodes of TE1 , TE2 , respectively, by Item 1 above, and
so E1 ∼= E2 by Item 2 above, contradicting our assumption. We conclude that TEST
must fail on some lower power of OE1,E2,e; let i




to make a prediction, based on the reason TEST fails. Here, we
illustrate a case that calls for the use of a weak key-authenticity test for expressions.




is labeled {M}K , u1 is labeled K, v2 is labeled {M ′}K′ , and u2 is labeled K ′′. An
inductive argument on the powers of our operator shows that x, y are the sampling
labels of either v1, u1, respectively, or v2, u2, respectively, depending on the origin
of e. Let x = 〈c, “ciphertext”〉, y = 〈k, “key”〉. In the first case, c is an encryption
of a sample from [[M ]]Π(η) with the key k; in the second case, c is an encryption of
a sample from [[M ′]]Π(η) with some key, and k is a random key. The WKA-EXP-
(M,M’) test on c and k distinguishes these cases with a non-negligible probability
of success.
We conclude the proof by noting that the above procedure is efficient.
2.3.2.2 The Parsing Lemma
We begin by showing that the powers of OE1,E2,e effectively parse e in a manner
consistent with the structures of E1 or E2.
Lemma 2.3.3 (Parsing lemma). Fix j ∈ {1, 2}. If e R← [[Ej]]Π(η), then for all i
and for all (u1, u2, y) ∈ OiE1,E2,e, y is the sampling label that was assigned to uj by
SampleΠ[η](Ej) in the computation of e.
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Proof. Assume e
R← [[Ej]]Π(η). Proceed by induction on i. The base case holds





• u1 = rE1 , u2 = rE2 , y = e, as in part (a) of the definition of OE1,E2,e. By the
definition of SampleΠ[η] on Ej, e is indeed the sampling label assigned to uj
while computing e.
• ∃(v1, v2, x) ∈ OiE1,E2,e, vj is labeled (M,N), uj is its left child in TEj and x is
of the form 〈y, z, “pair”〉, as in part (b) of the definition of OE1,E2,e. By the
induction hypothesis, x is the sampling label given to vj by SampleΠ[η](Ej)
while computing e. By the definition of SampleΠ[η] on Ej, y is indeed the
sampling label given to uj while computing e. The symmetric case (as in part
(c) of the definition of OE1,E2,e) is similar.
• ∃(v1, v2, x), (w1, w2, z) ∈ OiE1,E2,e such that vj is labeled {M}K , uj is its child
in TEj , x is of the form 〈c, “ciphertext”〉, wj is labeled K, z is of the form
〈k, “key”〉 and y = Dk(c), as in part (d) of the definition of OE1,E2,e. By the
induction hypothesis, x and z are the sampling labels assigned to vj, wj by
SampleΠ[η](Ej), respectively, while computing e. As the sampling algorithm
consistently assigns computational keys across a derivation tree, k must have
been the key used to encrypt the sampling label of uj when computing c. By
the definition of SampleΠ[η] on Ej, y then is indeed the sampling label given
to uj while computing e.

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2.3.2.3 The Isomorphism Lemma
As we proceed, we would like to see what TEST “tells us” when applied to
a power of OE1,E2,e. The following notation, referring to various restrictions of a
























∃(v1, v2, ·) ∈ OiE1,E2,e such that v1 is
labeled K1 and v2 is labeled K2

In addition, for j ∈ {1, 2}, A ⊆ VEj , let TAEj denote the subgraph induced by A on
TEj . We claim the following:










as rooted, ordered trees. Furthermore, if TEST(OiE1,E2,e) holds,
then σi : KeysiE1 → Keys
i
E2
is a bijection, and for all v ∈ V iE1,
1. if v is labeled with a bit, then ϕi(v) is labeled with an identical bit.
2. if v is labeled K, then ϕi(v) is labeled with σi(K).
3. if v is labeled (M,N), then ϕi(v) is labeled (M ′, N ′).
4. if v is labeled {M}K and there exists a u ∈ V iE1 labeled K, then ϕ
i(v) is labeled
{M ′}σi(K) and ϕi(u) is labeled σi(K).
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5. if v is labeled {M}K and there does not exists a u ∈ V iE1 labeled K, then ϕ
i(v)
is labeled {M ′}K′ and there does not exist a u′ ∈ V iE2 labeled K
′.
Note the similarity to Claim 2.1.1.
Proof. We prove that for all i, ϕi : V iE1 → V
i
E2






as rooted, ordered trees; the rest of the claim follows in a straightforward manner
from the definition of TEST.
First, we show that ϕi is a function, by induction. The base case holds vacu-
ously. As for the step, assume (u1, u2), (u1, u
′
2) ∈ ϕi. Then there exist (u1, u2, y), (u1, u′2, y′) ∈
OiE1,E2,e. u1 is either the root of TE1 or has a unique parent v in TE1 . We have that
either:
• u1 = rE1 , u2 = u′2 = rE2 (and y = y′ = e) as in part (a) of the definition of
OE1,E2,e.
• There exists a (v1, v2, x) ∈ Oi−1E1,E2,e, related to (u1, u2, y) as in part (b) of
the definition of OE1,E2,e, and there exists a (v1, v
′
2, x




′) as in part (b) of the definition of OE1,E2,e. In particular, v1 has u1
as a left child in TE1 , and v2, v
′
2 have u1, u
′
2 as left children, respectively, in TE2 .
By the induction hypothesis, ϕi−1 is a function and so v2 = v
′
2. It follows that
u2 = u
′
2. The symmetric case (related to part (c) of the definition of OE1,E2,e)
is similar.
• There exist (v1, v2, x), (w1, w2, z) ∈ Oi−1E1,E2,e, related to (u1, u2, y) as in part (d)








related to (u1, u
′
2, y
′) as in part (d) of the definition of OE1,E2,e. In particular,
v1 has u1 as a child in TE1 , and v2, v
′
2 have u2, u
′
2 as their respective children in
TE2 . By the induction hypothesis, ϕ
i−1 is a function and so v2 = v
′
2. It follows
that u2 = u
′
2.
The argument for ϕi being one-to-one is completely symmetric.




ϕi(v) has children (ϕi(u1), ϕ




. For the only-if part, assume
that both v1, labeled (M,N), and its left child u1 are in T
V iE1
E1
. By definition, v1, u1 ∈
V iE1 and so there exist (v1, v2, x), (u1, u2, y) ∈ O
i
E1,E2,e
. By definition, ϕi(v1) = v2,
ϕi(u1) = u2, v2, u2 ∈ V iE2 and are also in T
V iE2
E2
; we have to show that u2 is the left
child of v2. As (u1, u2, y) ∈ OiE1,E2,e, there exists a (v1, v
′
2, x
′) ∈ Oi−1E1,E2,e related to
it as in part (b) of the definition of OE1,E2,e. In particular, u2 is the left child of v
′
2.
Now Oi−1E1,E2,e ⊆ O
i
E1,E2,e
, therefore (v1, v
′
2, x
′) ∈ OiE1,E2,e. ϕ
i is a function, and so it
must be the case that v2 = v
′
2. u2 is thus shown to be the left child of v2. Similar
arguments establish the only-if part for a node labeled (M,N) and its right child;
and for a node labeled {M}K and its child. The if part is symmetric. 
2.3.2.4 The Reachable-Sets Lemma
We now relate the powers of OE1,E2,e to the powers of the operators OE1 , OE2 ,
whose fixpoints correspond to the sets of reachable nodes of TE1 , TE2 , respectively.
For j ∈ {1, 2}, let OEj : 2
VEj → 2VEj be the operator from the fixpoint characteriza-
tions of the set of reachable nodes of TEj (cf. Theorem 2.1.5).
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Lemma 2.3.5 (Reachable-Sets Lemma). For all i ∈ N, if TEST(OiE1,E2,e) holds,
then V i+1E1 = O
i+1
E1




Proof. We prove that for all i ∈ N, if TEST(OiE1,E2,e) holds, then V
i+1
E1
= Oi+1E1 ; the




We proceed with induction on i. For the base case, note that TEST(O0E1,E2,e)
holds vacuously and that V 1E1 = O
1
E1
= rE1 . As for the step, assume that the claim




OiE1,E2,e, and so TEST(O
i−1
E1,E2,e
) holds as well.
To show that V i+1E1 ⊆ O
i+1
E1
, let u1 ∈ V i+1E1 . Then there exists a (u1, u2, y) ∈
Oi+1E1,E2,e. It is the case that either:
• u1 = rE1 , u2 = rE2 , y = e as in part (a) of the definition of OE1,E2,e. But rE1
is also an element of Oi+1E1 , by the definition of OE1 .
• ∃(v1, v2, x) ∈ OiE1,E2,e, related to (u1, u2, y) as in part (b) of the definition
of OE1,E2,e. In particular, v1 is labeled (M,N) and has u1 as a left child in
TE1 . Now v1 ∈ V iE1 = O
i
E1
by the induction hypothesis, and so u1 ∈ Oi+1E1 by
the definition of OE1 . The symmetric case (as in part (c) of the definition of
OE1,E2,e) is similar.
• ∃(v1, v2, x), (w1, w2, z) ∈ OiE1,E2,e, related to (u1, u2, y) as in part (d) of the
definition of OE1,E2,e. In particular, v1 is labeled {M}K and has u1 as a child
in TE1 , w1 is labeled K. Now v1, w1 ∈ V iE1 = O
i
E1
by the induction hypothesis,
and so u1 ∈ Oi+1E1 by the definition of OE1 .
We now show that Oi+1E1 ⊆ V
i+1
E1
. Let u1 ∈ Oi+1E1 . Then either:
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• u1 = rE1 , as in part (a) of the definition of OE1 . By part (a) of the definition




• ∃v1 ∈ OiE1 such that v1 is labeled (M,N) and has u1 as a left child in TE1 , as in
part (b) of the definition of OE1 . By the induction hypothesis, v1 ∈ V iE1 . Then
∃(v1, v2, x) ∈ OiE1,E2,e. As TEST(O
i
E1,E2,e
) holds, it must be the case that v2 is
labeled (M ′, N ′) and so has a left child u2 in TE2 . Now by the Parsing Lemma,
x is the sampling label of either v1 or v2, depending on the origin of e. At any
rate, x is of the form 〈y, z, “pair”〉. By part (b) of the definition of OE1,E2,e,
(u1, u2, y) ∈ Oi+1E1,E2,e (where u2 is the left child of v2 in TE2). It follows that
u1 ∈ V i+1E1 . The symmetric case (related to part (c) of the definition of OE1)
is similar.
• ∃v1, w1 ∈ OiE1 such that v1 is labeled {M}K and has u1 as a left child in
TE1 , w1 is labeled K, as in part (d) of the definition of OE1 . By the induc-




TEST(OiE1,E2,e) holds, it must be the case that v2 is labeled {M
′}K′ and w2 is
labeled K ′. By the Parsing Lemma, x, z are the sampling labels, respectively,
of either v1, w1 or v2, w2, depending on the origin of e. In both cases, x and
z must be of the forms 〈c, “ciphertext”〉 and 〈k, “key”〉, respectively, by the
definition of the sampling procedure. By part (d) of the definition of OE1,E2,e,
(u1, u2,Dk(c)) ∈ Oi+1E1,E2,e (where u2 is the child of v2 in TE2). It follows that
u1 ∈ V i+1E1 .





2.3.2.5 Constructing a Distinguisher
We now turn to the main part of our argument. Informally, we use the Reachable-











achieve the sets of reachable nodes of TE1 , TE2 , respectively. At that point,




witness the equivalence of E1, E2,
in contradiction to our assumption that E1 6∼= E2. Therefore, there must exist an
i∗ ≤ i′ for which TEST(Oi∗E1,E2,e) fails. We use O
i∗
E1,E2,e
and the Parsing Lemma to
construct a distinguisher of [[E1]]Π(η), [[E2]]Π(η).
Formally, recall our assumption that E1 6∼= E2. Towards a contradiction, fur-




and V iE2 = O
i
E2
by the Reachable-Sets Lemma (and a straightforward verification
of the case where i = 0). Let |E1| = n1 and let i1 ≤ n1 be such that for all
j ≥ i1, OjE1 = RE1 , as guaranteed by the fixpoint characterization of RE1 (cf. Theo-
rem 2.1.5); similarly, for |E2| = n2, let i2 ≤ n2 be such that for all j ≥ i2, OjE2 = RE2 .




(i.e., V jE1 fixes). But for all such j, V
j
E1
is bijected onto V jE2 via ϕ
j by the Isomorphism








(cf. Lemma 2.1.2 and Theorem 2.1.5). We conclude that for i12 = min(i1, i2), we
have that V i12E1 = RE1 and V
i12
E2
= RE2 . But then ϕ
i12 and σi12 (when the latter
is properly extended to a bijection on Keys) witness the equivalence of E1, E2 by
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the Isomorphism Lemma, in contradiction to our assumption.
It follows that if E1 6∼= E2, there must exist an i ≤ min(|E1| , |E2|) such that
TEST(OiE1,E2,e) fails. Let i




have enough information to tell, with non-negligible probability of success, which
of [[E1]]Π(η), [[E2]]Π(η) e originated from. To that effect, we describe a procedure
Predict, that takes η (in unary) and Oi
∗
E1,E2,e
as inputs, and outputs 1 if it believes
e
R← [[E1]]Π(η), 0 otherwise. The behavior of Predict depends on the reason for which
TEST fails on Oi
∗
E1,E2,e
, as described below. For every possible reason and conse-
quent action, we analyze Predict’s advantage in distinguishing the above-mentioned
ensembles; the case discussed in Item 7 (and the symmetric one in Item 8) is where
our “thunder” lies — this is where Predict uses a weak key-authenticity test for two
specific expressions, admitted by Π.
The possible reasons for TEST to fail on Oi
∗
E1,E2,e
, and the corresponding ac-
tions by Predict (with their chances of success) are the following:
1. ∃(v1, v2, x) ∈ Oi
∗
E1,E2,e
such that v1 is labeled with a bit but v2 is not. If
e
R← [[E1]]Π(η), then x is the sampling label of v1 by the Parsing Lemma, and
is of the form 〈b, “bit”〉 by the labeling of v1 and the definition of Sample.
If e
R← [[E2]]Π(η), then x is the sampling label of v2 and is not of the form
〈b′, “bit”〉. Let Predictcase-1 be 1 if x = 〈b, “bit”〉, 0 otherwise. Clearly,
Advind[[E1]]Π(η),[[E2]]Π(η)(Predictcase-1) = 1.
2. ∃(v1, v2, x) ∈ Oi
∗
E1,E2,e
such that v1 is labeled with a bit b and v2 with b̄ (i.e.,
negated b). As in case (1), we let Predictcase-2 be 1 if x = 〈b, “bit”〉, 0 otherwise.
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Here too we have Advind[[E1]]Π(η),[[E2]]Π(η)(Predictcase-2) = 1.
3. ∃(v1, v2, x) ∈ Oi
∗
E1,E2,e
such that v1 is labeled with a key but v2 is not. As in
case (1), we let Predictcase-3 be 1 if x = 〈k, “key”〉, 0 otherwise. Once again, it
is clear that Advind[[E1]]Π(η),[[E2]]Π(η)(Predictcase-3) = 1.
4. ∃(v1, v2, x), (u1, u2, y) ∈ Oi
∗
E1,E2,e
such that v1 and u1 are labeledK, v2 is labeled
K ′ and u2 is labeled K
′′ (where K ′ 6= K ′′). If e R← [[E1]]Π(η), then x and y are
the sampling labels of v1 and u1, respectively, by the Parsing Lemma. Since
both are labeled with the same key, Sample computes k
R← K(1η) and assigns
to both nodes a sampling label 〈k, “key”〉. If e R← [[E2]]Π(η), then x and y
are the sampling labels of v2 and u2, respectively. But since they are labeled
with distinct formal keys, Sample computes k, k′
R← K(1η) and assigns to one
a sampling label 〈k, “key”〉 and to the other a sampling label 〈k′, “key”〉. Let
Predictcase-4 be 1 if x = y = 〈k, “key”〉, 0 otherwise. We have:
Advind[[E1]]Π(η),[[E2]]Π(η)(Predictcase-4)
= Pr[e R← [[E1]]Π(η);B ← Oi
∗
E1,E2,e : Predictcase-4(1
η, B) = 1]
− Pr[e R← [[E2]]Π(η);B ← Oi
∗
E1,E2,e : Predictcase-4(1
η, B) = 1]
= Pr[k R← K(1η) : k = k]− Pr[k, k′ R← K(1η) : k = k′]
= 1− Pr[k, k′ R← K(1η) : k = k′]
= Pr[k, k′ R← K(1η) : k 6= k′],
which is non-negligible in η as K distributes keys decently.
5. ∃(v1, v2, x), (u1, u2, y) ∈ Oi
∗
E1,E2,e
such that v2 and u2 are labeledK, v1 is labeled
K ′ and u1 is labeled K
′′ (where K ′ 6= K ′′). As in case (4), we let Predictcase-5
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be 1 if x = 〈k, “key”〉 and y = 〈k′, “key”〉 where k 6= k′, 0 otherwise. As before,
we have that Advind[[E1]]Π(η),[[E2]]Π(η)(Predictcase-5) is non-negligible (as a function of
η).
6. ∃(v1, v2, x) ∈ Oi
∗
E1,E2,e
such that v1 is labeled (M,N) but v2 is not labeled
(M ′, N ′). As in case (1), we let Predictcase-6 be 1 if x = 〈m,n, “pair”〉, 0
otherwise. Clearly, we have that Advind[[E1]]Π(η),[[E2]]Π(η)(Predictcase-6) = 1.
7. ∃(v1, v2, x), (u1, u2, y) ∈ Oi
∗
E1,E2,e
such that v1 is labeled {M}K , v2 is labeled
{M ′}K′ , u1 is labeled K and u2 is labeled K ′′. If e
R← [[E1]]Π(η), then x and
y are the sampling labels of v1 and u1, respectively, by the Parsing Lemma.
Because of their labeling and the consistent assignment of keys by Sample
across a derivation tree, x must be of the form 〈c, “ciphertext”〉, y of the form
〈k, “key”〉 where k R← K(1η), and c is the encryption of some string with k. If
e
R← [[E2]]Π(η), then x and y are the sampling labels of v2 and u2, respectively.
Because of their labeling and the definition of Sample, x must be of the form
〈c, “ciphertext”〉, y of the form 〈k, “key”〉 where k R← K(1η), and c is the
encryption of some string with k′ where k′
R← K(1η).
Let A be the WKA-EXP-(M,M ′) test admitted by Π. We let Predictcase-7 be
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1 if A(1η, c, k) = 1, 0 otherwise. We have:
Advind[[E1]]Π(η),[[E2]]Π(η)(Predictcase-7)
= Pr[e R← [[E1]]Π(η);B ← Oi
∗
E1,E2,e : Predictcase-7(1
η, B) = 1]
− Pr[e R← [[E2]]Π(η);B ← Oi
∗
E1,E2,e : Predictcase-7(1
η, B) = 1]
= Pr[e R← [[M ]]Π(η); k
R← K(1η); c R← Ek(e) : A(1η, c, k) = 1]
− Pr[e R← [[M ′]]Π(η); k, k′
R← K(1η); c R← Ek′(e) : A(1η, c, k) = 1]
= Advwka-expΠ[η],M,M ′(A),
which is non-negligible (as a function of η) by the definition of the WKA-EXP
test for expressions.
8. ∃(v1, v2, x), (u1, u2, y) ∈ Oi
∗
E1,E2,e
such that v1 is labeled {M}K′ , v2 is labeled
{M ′}K , u1 is labeled K ′′ and u2 is labeled K. As in case (7), we have x =
〈c, “ciphertext”〉 and y = 〈k, “key”〉. Let A be the WKA-EXP-(M,M ′) test
admitted by Π, and let Predictcase-8 be 1 if A(1
η, c, k) = 0, 0 otherwise. As
in case (7), we get that Advind[[E1]]Π(η),[[E2]]Π(η)(Predictcase-8) is non-negligible (as a
function of η).
Having covered all possible cases, we conclude that Advind[[E1]]Π(η),[[E2]]Π(η)(Predict) is
non-negligible (as a function of η).












R← [[E1]]Π(η) : DE1,E2(1η, e) = 1]
− Pr[e R← [[E2]]Π(η) : DE1,E2(1η, e) = 1]
= Pr[e
R← [[E1]]Π(η);B ← Oi
∗
E1,E2,e
: Predict(1η, B) = 1]
− Pr[e R← [[E2]]Π(η);B ← Oi
∗
E1,E2,e
: Predict(1η, B) = 1]
= Advind[[E1]]Π(η),[[E2]]Π(η)(Predict),
which is non-negligible (as a function of η). Finally, it is simple to verify that D
runs in time polynomial in η. This completes the proof of the sufficiency part of our
main theorem.
2.4 How Weak Key-Authenticity Relates to Other Cryptographic
Notions
Here, we relate the notion of weak key-authenticity with other relevant cryp-
tographic notions. We begin by strengthening the notion of the admittance of weak
key-authenticity tests for expressions; the strengthened flavor considers the admit-
tance of a single, all-purpose test, hereby referred to as the weak key-authenticity
test, that distinguishes any ciphertext and the key it was encrypted with from any
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ciphertext and a random key, with a non-negligible probability. We stress that the
strengthened test is defined in terms that are independent of the formal language
of the preceding sections. We compare the strengthened flavor with the notions of
confusion-freedom and authenticated encryption, previously discussed in the liter-
ature in the context of a computational-completeness result for formal symmetric-
encryption [AJ01, MW04a]. Specifically, we show that the requirement that an
encryption scheme admits a weak key-authenticity test is strictly weaker than the
requirement that it be confusion-free, as defined there (which, in turn, is enough
to show it is strictly weaker than authenticated encryption as well). To that effect,
we present an encryption scheme that admits a weak key-authenticity test but is
not confusion-free. The scheme we present is also Type-0. It therefore satisfies
the soundness criterion of [AR02], our completeness criterion, but not the previous
completeness criterion of [MW04a]. The notions we present and the methods used
to achieve the admittance of a weak key-authenticity test should be of independent
interest.
Informally, confusion-freedom captures the ability of a decryption algorithm
to distinguish a ciphertext and the key it was encrypted with from a ciphertext
and a random key with almost full certainty. In contrast, the weak key-authenticity
test is required to distinguish the two with merely a non-negligible probability. We
will separate the notions in a strong sense, pertaining directly to the gap in their
required distinguishing certainties (as opposed to pertaining to the placement of the
distinguisher—inside or outside the decryption algorithm).
We begin with formal definitions of the notions at hand. Confusion-freedom
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is defined as it appears in the completeness result of [MW04a]; our proofs can be
modified to accommodate the version of [AJ01] as well.
Definition 2.4.1 (Confusion-Freedom). Let Π = (K, E ,D) be an encryption scheme,
η ∈ N a security parameter, and D[η] = {D1[η], . . . , Dl[η]} a series of finite sets of
distributions. For 1 ≤ i ≤ l, define:
AdvcfΠ[η],D[η],i = Pr[k, k
′ R← K(1η);x R← Di[η] : Dk′(Ek(x)) 6= ⊥].
We say that Π is confusion-free (CF for short) if for any 1 ≤ i ≤ l, AdvcfΠ[η],D[η],i is
negligible (as a function of η). ♦
Next, we define two auxiliary notions that will provide a “middle ground” for
comparing WKA-EXP tests with CF.
Definition 2.4.2 (Strong Key-Authenticity Test, Weak Key-Authenticity Test).
Let Π = (K, E ,D) be an encryption scheme, η ∈ N a security parameter. Let
P1,P2 (hereby referred to as plaintext generators) be probabilistic algorithms that
take a security parameter η (provided in unary), and for sufficiently large η always
return an x ∈ PlainΠ[η]; we write x
R← Pj(1η) for j ∈ {1, 2}, thinking of x as being





R← K(1η); c R← Ek(x) : A(1η, c, k) = 1]
− Pr[x R← P2(1η); k, k′
R← K(1η); c R← Ek(x) : A(1η, c, k′) = 1],
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where tst ∈ {ska,wka}. We say that Π admits a strong (resp., weak) key-authenticity
test, SKA (resp., WKA) for short, if there exists a probabilistic, polynomial-time al-
gorithm A such that for all probabilistic, polynomial-time algorithms P1,P2,
AdvskaΠ[η],P1[η],P2[η](A) (resp., Adv
wka
Π[η],P1[η],P2[η](A)) is negligibly close to 1 (resp., is
non-negligible) as a function of η. ♦
As for the definition of integrity of plaintext security (INT-PTXT for short),
a flavor of authenticated encryption, we refer the reader to [BN00, KY00] and
to [MW04a].
















In the above, A −→ B means that an encryption scheme that meets notion A must
also meet notion B; we call such a relationship an implication. A 6−→ B means that
an encryption scheme that meets notion A does not necessarily meet notion B; we
call such a relationship a separation.
The implications in the diagram are mostly straightforward. For INT-PTXT −→
CF, refer to [MW04a]. For CF −→ SKA, let A(1η, c, k) be an algorithm that outputs
1 if Dk(c) 6= ⊥, 0 otherwise. By noticing that for any x ∈ PlainΠ[η], Dk(Ek(x)) 6= ⊥
by the correctness of Π, and by letting D[η] be {P2(1η)}, the implication follows.
SKA −→WKA is trivial. As for WKA −→WKA-EXP tests, we let the WKA test
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serve as a WKA-EXP test for any pair of expressions. As we assumed that for any
expression E and for large enough η, e
R← [[E]]Π(η) is such that e ∈ PlainΠ[η], the
implication follows.
The rest of the section is devoted to the separation of WKA from SKA. To that
end, we show an encryption scheme that admits a WKA test but does not admit
an SKA test. We use a standard construction based on a pseudorandom function
family, with an added “weak redundancy”. To simplify the exposition, we use a
single, constant bit as redundancy; see the end of the section for a generalization.
Let F be a pseudorandom family of functions with a security parameter η ∈ N,
key domain {0, 1}η, domain {0, 1}l(η) and range {0, 1}L(η) (where l, L are polynomials
in η); let ε be a negligible function such that AdvprfF [η](A) ≤ ε(η) for any probabilistic,
polynomial-time algorithm A. We use x1x2 · · ·xm to denote the individual bits of
a string x ∈ {0, 1}m. We use ◦ to denote the concatenation operator on strings of
bits, ⊕ to denote the bitwise XOR operator on strings of bits of equal length.
Define an encryption scheme Π∗ = (K∗, E∗,D∗) with a security parameter
η ∈ N as follows:
K∗(1η) E∗k (x = x1x2 · · ·xL(η)−1) D∗k(〈y = y1y2 · · · yL(η), r〉)
k
R← {0, 1}η; r R← {0, 1}l(η); x′ ← y ⊕ Fk(r);
Output k. y ← (x ◦ 1)⊕ Fk(r); Output x′1x′2 · · ·x′L(η)−1.
Output 〈y, r〉.
Note that PlainΠ∗[η] = {0, 1}L(η)−1. Also note that E∗ and D∗ can deduce η from k
(i.e., η = |k|).
Π∗ can easily be shown to be IND-CPA secure based on the pseudorandomness
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of F . For a proof, see [GGM86], or simply think of Π∗ as a degenerate version of
the randomized CTR mode, and rely on [BDJR97]. Using the results of [AR02], it
can further be shown to be Type-0. We have that:
Theorem 2.4.3. Π∗ admits a WKA test.
Proof. Let A be the following algorithm:
A(1η, 〈y = y1y2 · · · yL(η), r〉, k)
x′ ← y ⊕ Fk(r);




We show that A is a WKA test for Π∗. (Note that 1η is redundant as an input to
A here, as A takes k as input and |k| = η.)
Let P1,P2 be probabilistic, polynomial-time algorithms that take η ∈ N (in
unary) as input and output x ∈ PlainΠ[η] for large enough η. Then for such η,
AdvwkaΠ∗[η],P1[η],P2[η](A)
= Pr[x R← P1(1η); k
R← K∗(1η); c R← E∗k (x) : A(1η, c, k) = 1]
− Pr[x R← P2(1η); k, k′
R← K∗(1η); c R← E∗k (x) : A(1η, c, k′) = 1]
= Pr[x R← P1(1η); k
R← {0, 1}η ; r R← {0, 1}l(η) ;x′ ← (x ◦ 1)⊕ Fk(r)⊕ Fk(r) : x′L(η) = 1]
− Pr[x R← P2(1η); k, k′
R← {0, 1}η ; r R← {0, 1}l(η) ;x′ ← (x ◦ 1)⊕ Fk(r)⊕ Fk′(r) : x′L(η) = 1]
The first term of the last equality above clearly equals 1. Let q(η) denote the second
term; we bound it here via a reduction to the pseudorandomness of F . Let B be
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y ← (x ◦ 1)⊕ g(r);
k′
R← {0, 1}η;




= Pr[k R← {0, 1}η : BFk(·)(1η) = 1]− Pr[f R← Funcl(η)→L(η) : Bf(·)(1η) = 1]
= Pr
 x
R← P2(1η); k, k′
R← {0, 1}η ; r R← {0, 1}l(η) ;
x′ ← (x ◦ 1)⊕ Fk(r)⊕ Fk′(r)





R← Funcl(η)→L(η); k′ R← {0, 1}η ;
r
R← {0, 1}l(η) ;x′ ← (x ◦ 1)⊕ f(r)⊕ Fk′(r)





where the second term above is 1
2
because x′L(η) is the outcome of XORing a truely
random bit with some other bit. By the pseudorandomness of F , we have that
AdvprfF [η](B) ≤ ε(η) where ε(η) is a negligible function. Note that it must also be the
case that AdvprfF [η](B) ≥ −ε(η) for any A, otherwise an algorithm with an advantage
smaller than −ε(η) can be converted into an algorithm with an advantage greater
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than ε(η) by flipping its output. We conclude that:
1
2
− ε(η) ≤ q(η) ≤ 1
2
+ ε(η).
Putting it all together, we get that:
1
2




which is a non-negligible quantity.
Theorem 2.4.4. Π∗ does not admit an SKA test.
Proof. Let A be a probabilistic algorithm that runs in time t, a function of the
size of its input. Let A(a1, a2, . . . ;w) denote the outcome of running A on inputs
a1, a2, . . . and randomness w. Note that the length of w is bounded by t.
Let U be an algorithm that takes η ∈ N (in unary) as input and outputs a




R← {0, 1}L(η)−1 ; k R← {0, 1}η ; r R← {0, 1}l(η) ;
w
R← {0, 1}t(η) ; y ← (x ◦ 1)⊕ Fk(r)




R← {0, 1}L(η)−1 ; k, k′ R← {0, 1}η ; r R← {0, 1}l(η) ;
w
R← {0, 1}t(η) ; y ← (x ◦ 1)⊕ Fk(r)
: A(1η, 〈y, r〉, k′;w) = 1
 ,
where t is a polynomial in η.
Let S1 and A1 ⊆ S1 denote the sample space and event, respectively, depicted
by the first term above. Let S2 and A2 ⊆ S2 be defined similarly with respect to
the second term.
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Let (x0, k0, r0, w0) ∈ A1. Note that for any k ∈ {0, 1}η, if there exists an
x ∈ {0, 1}L(η)−1 such that (x ◦ 1)⊕ Fk(r0) = (x0 ◦ 1)⊕ Fk0(r0), then it must be the
case that (x, k, k0, r0, w0) ∈ A2 (because in this case, A, in the second experiment,
runs on the same input and randomness as in the first experiment). This happens







of the keys k ∈ {0, 1}η; otherwise, an adversary that queries its oracle on r0, XORs
the answer with (x0 ◦ 1) and with Fk0(r0), and outputs 1 if the last bit of the result
is different than 1, 0 otherwise—breaks the pseudorandomness of F .





·2η tuples in A2. We would like to argue that for a distinct (x1, k1, r1, w1) ∈
A1, we would be counting different tuples in A2 by employing the same method.
This is clear if k1 6= k0 or r1 6= r0 or w1 6= w0. As for the case that k1 = k0, r1 =
r0, w1 = w0, we would be double-counting a tuple iff
(x0 ◦ 1)⊕ Fk0(r0)⊕ Fk(r0) = (x1 ◦ 1)⊕ Fk1(r1)⊕ Fk(r1) = (x1 ◦ 1)⊕ Fk0(r0)⊕ Fk(r0),
which happens iff x1 = x0.






·2η ·|A1|. We also know that |S2| = 2η ·|S1|.
Therefore:
















which is not negligibly close to 1.
Finally, we note that our construction can be easily generalized to one that
admits a WKA test with an advantage as small as desired, as follows. For any
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, as redundancy upon encryption (instead of the fixed 1).






The Efficiency of Generic Commitments
Here, we demonstrate lower-bounds on the number of times a one-way permu-
tation needs to be invoked (as a “black-box”) in order to construct statistically-
binding commitments, as outlined in Section 1.2. The chapter is organized as
follows. In Section 3.1, we define black-box constructions of statistically-binding
schemes based on one-way permutations, and review tools and results used in our
proof. In Section 3.2 we prove our lower bounds. In Section 3.3 we compare our
bounds with the efficiency of known constructions.
3.1 Definitions and Tools
Our definitions in this chapter use the notion of computational indistinguisha-
bility by polynomial-sized circuits; contrast with indistinguishability by probabilis-
tic, polynomial-time algorithms used in Chapter 2, and with the indistinguishabil-
ity by probabilistic, polynomial-time algorithms taking non-uniform “advice”, used
in Chapter 4; see discussion in Section 4.1.1.
3.1.1 Preliminaries
Let Af denote a circuit A with oracle access to the function f . A function





[Af (f(x)) ∈ f−1(f(x))] ≤ ε.
To reduce the number of parameters, we will call a function S-hard if it is (S, 1/S)-
one way.
Let Πt denote the set of all permutations over {0, 1}t. We will rely on the
following result:
Theorem 3.1.1 ([GGKT05]). For sufficiently large t, a random π ∈ Πt is 2t/5-hard
with probability at least 1− 2−2t/2.
Let a ◦ b denote the concatenation of strings a and b. For t < n, let Πt,n denote the
subset of Πn such that π ∈ Πt,n iff π(a ◦ b) = π̂(a) ◦ b for some π̂ ∈ Πt (i.e., the last
n− t bits of the input are fixed). A corollary of Theorem 3.1.1 is that if t = 5 logS,
then for any n > t, a randomly chosen π ∈ Πt,n is S-hard with high probability;
more formally:
Corollary 3.1.2 ([GGKT05]). For sufficiently large t and n > t, a random π ∈ Πt,n
is 2t/5-hard with probability at least 1− 2−2t/2.
We say that two distributions X ,Y are (S, ε)-indistinguishable, and write
X
(S,ε)
≈ Y , if for every circuit Dist of size at most S, we have∣∣∣∣ Prx∈X [Dist(x) = 1]− Prx∈Y[Dist(x) = 1]
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε.
3.1.2 Commitment Schemes
A commitment scheme for m-bit messages is defined by a pair of probabilistic,
interactive algorithms (S,R) representing a sender and a receiver, respectively. The
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inputs to S are a message M ∈ {0, 1}m and a random tape s, while the input to R is
a random tape r. (S,R) describe a commitment phase of the interaction between the
parties; call C = 〈S (M ; s),R(r)〉 a commitment to M . Without loss of generality,
we assume that the commitment phase is followed by a generic decommitment phase,
in which the sender reveals a message a random tape to the receiver; call these a
decommitment. We say that C as above can be decommitted to a message M ′ if
there exists a string s′ such that 〈S (M ′; s′),R(r)〉 = C.
Let 〈S (M ; s),R∗(r)〉 denote the view of a (possibly malicious) receiver R∗
following an interaction with the sender on the specified inputs; this view consists
of the receiver’s randomness and the messages it receives from the sender during the
interaction (when the receiver makes queries to an oracle, the view also includes the




R← {0, 1}∗ : 〈S (M ; s),R∗(r)〉
}
;
i.e., this denotes the view of R∗ following an interaction with the honest sender who
is committing to message M .
We now define the security of a commitment scheme; we deal here with
statistically-binding commitments, as reflected by the definitions below.
Definition 3.1.3. Let (S,R) be a commitment scheme for m-bit messages. We say
that (S,R) is (Sh, εh)-hiding if for every circuit R∗ of size at most Sh and for all




We say that (S,R) is εb-binding if
Pr
r
 ∃ distinct M,M ′ ∈ {0, 1}m , s, s′ such that
〈S (M ′; s′),R(r)〉 = 〈S (M ; s),R(r)〉
 ≤ εb.
Note that if (S,R) is εb-binding then even an all-powerful sender cannot commit to a
message M , then later decommit to a different message M ′, except with probability
(at most) εb. We say that (S,R) is εb-binding for an honest sender if for all M ∈
{0, 1}m, we have
Pr
s,r
 ∃M ′ ∈ {0, 1}m \M, s′ such that
〈S (M ′; s′),R(r)〉 = 〈S (M ; s),R(r)〉
 ≤ εb.
Roughly speaking, such a scheme satisfies the following property: if the sender is
honest during the commitment phase (and uses a pre-fixed message M and truly
random coins s) then the sender cannot later decommit to a different message M ′
except with probability (at most) εb. If εb = 0 in either of the above definitions, we
say the scheme is perfectly binding.
Finally, we say that (S,R) is (Sh, εh, εb)-secure (resp., secure for an honest
sender) if (S,R) is (Sh, εh)-hiding and εb-binding (resp., binding for an honest
sender). ♦
We may now define a (weak black-box [RTV04]) construction of a commitment
scheme based on one-way permutations.
Definition 3.1.4. A construction of a commitment scheme for m-bit messages
based on one-way permutations is a pair of oracle algorithms (S(·),R(·)) such that,
for all π ∈ Πn, the resulting (Sπ,Rπ) is a commitment scheme for m-bit messages.
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We say that (S(·),R(·)) is a construction which is (Sp, Sh, εh, εb)-secure (resp., secure
for an honest sender) if (Sπ,Rπ) is εb-binding (resp., binding for an honest sender)
for every π ∈ Πn, and furthermore for every π ∈ Πn that is Sp-hard, (Sπ,Rπ) is
(Sh, εh)-hiding. ♦
3.1.3 Pairwise-Independent Function Families
Let H be a family of functions mapping m-bit strings to m′-bit strings. We
assume that the following can be done in time polynomial in m: (1) selecting a
function h ∈ H uniformly at random; (2) given h ∈ H and x ∈ {0, 1}m, evaluating
h(x); and (3) given h∗, deciding whether h∗ ∈ H or not. We say that H is a
pairwise-independent hash family [CW79] if for any distinct x1, x2 ∈ {0, 1}m and





[h(x1) = y1 ∧ h(x2) = y2] = 2−2m
′
.
Constructions satisfying the above requirements are well known.
3.2 Lower Bounds on the Efficiency of Generic Commitment
Let (S(·),R(·)) be an (Sp, Sh, εh, εb)-secure construction of a commitment scheme
for m-bit messages based on one-way permutations. For εb > 0, we prove that un-
less S and R (combined) make Ω ((m− log(1 + 2m · εb))/ logSp) queries to their
oracle, there exists (constructively) a commitment scheme (S̄, R̄) secure for an hon-
est sender which does not require any oracle access at all (i.e., the scheme is secure
unconditionally). For εb = 0, we show a similar result but where the implication
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holds unless S alone makes Ω (m/ logSp) queries to its oracle. In either case, by
applying a result of Impagliazzo and Luby [IL89] (cf. also Lemma 3.2.1 below), this
implies the unconditional existence of a one-way function, which in turn can be used
to give an unconditional construction of a commitment scheme [Nao91].
We begin with an informal discussion of the key ideas behind our proof, fo-
cusing for ease of exposition on the case where (S(·),R(·)) is perfectly binding. As
in [GGKT05], our starting point is that a random π ∈ Πt,n (for t = Θ(logSp)) is
Sp-hard with all but negligible probability (cf. Corollary 3.1.2). Consider the non-
interactive scheme (S ′,R′) in which S ′ locally runs (S(·),R(·)), simulating a random
π ∈ Πt,n for S,R,1 and then sends the resulting view of R to R′.
It is quite straightforward to show that (S ′,R′) still satisfies hiding. Binding,
however, may not necessarily hold (even when S ′ is honest during the commitment
phase). To see the issue, assume S ′ commits to a message M using coins s for S(·),
coins r for R(·), and coins y to simulate the permutation. Let C denote the resulting
view of R, and let P denote the set of t-bit query/answer prefixes made by S during
the computation. To claim binding, we would need to argue that there does not exist
a message M ′ 6= M along with coins s′, y′, with an associated set of query/answer
prefixes P ′, that produce an identical view C (note that the coins r are fixed, since
r is explicit in C). The most we can claim, though, is that this is true as long as
P ′ = P , since binding is only guaranteed to hold when the permutation π is fixed,
but not when the sender can “change” the permutation after the fact.
1This can be done easily by selecting random t-bit answer-prefixes for any new t-bit query-
prefixes, as needed; see details in the proof of Theorem 3.2.2.
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What we can show is that a weaker form of (honest sender) binding holds for
(S ′,R′). Observe that for any possible P ′ (as defined above), there is at most one
message M ′ to which the sender can successfully decommit by sending M ′, s′, y′ with
associated query/answer set P ′; this is because (S(·),R(·)) is perfectly binding for
any fixed permutation. But this implies that there are at most 22t|P
′| = 22tq different
messages to which the sender can successfully decommit, where q is the total number
of queries made by S (note that the oracle queries/answers of R are already fixed
by the view C). Although this clearly violates binding, it does limit the space of
possible messages to which the sender can decommit, as long as 22tq < 2m.
We now show how to “bootstrap” from the weak form of binding achieved by
(S ′,R′) to construct a non-interactive scheme (S̄, R̄) that achieves “full” binding
(for an honest sender) with noticeable probability. Sender S̄, on input a message
M , proceeds as follows: it first chooses a function h uniformly at random from a
pairwise-independent hash family mapping m-bit strings to m-bit strings. It then
computes the views C1 = S ′(M), C2 = S ′(h(M)), and sends C1 ◦ C2 ◦ h to R̄.
Hiding for this scheme follows easily via a standard hybrid argument and relying
on the fact that (S ′,R′) is hiding. As for binding (for an honest sender), we have
already seen that C1 can be decommitted to a set S1 of at most 2
2tq < 2m different
messages, and similarly C2 can be decommitted to a set S2 of at most 2
2tq different
messages. For binding not to hold, there must exist an M ′ 6= M with M ′ ∈ S1 and
h(M ′) ∈ S2. Using the pairwise-independence of h, we can argue that this occurs
with only “small” probability over choice of h. Thus, binding for (S̄, R̄) (for an
honest sender) holds with noticeable probability.
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3.2.1 Honest-Sender Commitment Implies One-Way Functions
We begin by showing that the existence of a commitment scheme secure for
honest senders implies the existence of a one-way function. Although the result can
be derived from [IL89], we give a simple and more direct proof here.
Lemma 3.2.1. Let (S,R) be a commitment scheme for m-bit messages which is
(Sh, εh, εb)-secure for an honest sender. Let SS , SR be the sizes of the circuits com-
puting S,R, respectively. Then there exists an (Sh−SS +SR−O(m), εh +2εb)-one-
way function.
Proof. Let S∗ = Sh − SS + SR − O(m) and ε∗ = εh + 2εb. Define a function f
via f(M, s, r)
def
= 〈S (M ; s),R(r)〉. We claim that f is (S∗, ε∗)-one-way. Assume the





[B(f(M, s, r)) ∈ f−1(f(M, s, r))] > ε∗.
We use B to construct a circuit A that violates the hiding property of (S,R). On
input (M0,M1, C), where C is either a commitment to M0 or M1, A computes
(M ′, s′, r′)← B(C) and checks whether f(M ′, s′, r′) ?= C and whether M ′ ?= M0. If




= {(M, s, r) | ∃M ′ 6= M, s′ : 〈S (M ; s),R(r)〉 = 〈S (M ′; s′),R(r)〉}. In
what follows, note that if (M ′, s′, r′) ∈ f−1(f(M, s, r)) then r′ = r, as r is included
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[A(M0,M1, C) = 0]
= Pr
M0,s,r
 (M ′, s′, r′)← B(f(M0, s, r)) :
(M ′, s′, r′) ∈ f−1(f(M0, s, r))
∧




 (M ′, s′, r′)← B(f(M0, s, r)) :
(M ′, s′, r′) ∈ f−1(f(M0, s, r))
∧





 (M ′, s′, r′)← B(f(M0, s, r)) :





 (M ′, s′, r′)← B(f(M0, s, r)) :
(M ′, s′, r′) ∈ f−1(f(M0, s, r))
∧




 (M ′, s′, r′)← B(f(M0, s, r)) :
(M ′, s′, r′) ∈ f−1(f(M0, s, r))
− PrM0,s,r[(M0, s, r) ∈ Bad]
≥ SuccowfB,f − εb










 (M ′, s′, r′)← B(f(M1, s, r)) :
(M ′, s′, r′) ∈ f−1(f(M1, s, r))
∧





 (M ′, s′, r′)← B(f(M1, s, r)) :
(M ′, s′, r′) ∈ f−1(f(M1, s, r))
∧




[(M1, s, r) ∈ Bad]
≤ εb.
Putting everything together, we have:∣∣∣∣∣ PrM0,M1
C∈〈S (M0),R〉
[A(M0,M1, C) = 0]− Pr
M0,M1
C∈〈S (M1),R〉
[A(M0,M1, C) = 0]
∣∣∣∣∣ > εh.
But this implies that there exist two messages M0,M1 for which A can distinguish
〈S (M0),R〉 from 〈S (M1),R〉 with probability greater than εh, contradicting the
hiding of (S,R).
3.2.2 Lower Bound
We now formalize the intuition that was discussed earlier. We remark that
the proof below is not quite as straightforward as the intuition would suggest, since
some technical work is required to deal with the case of statistical (as opposed than
perfect) binding.
Theorem 3.2.2. Let (S(·),R(·)) be an (Sp, Sh, εh, εb)-secure construction of a com-
mitment scheme for m-bit messages that expects an oracle π ∈ Πn. Let t =
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5 logSp. Assume εh ≤ 1/8 − 2−Sp. If εb > 0 and S and R make a total of
q ≤ (m − 2 − log(1 + 2m+1 · εb))/4t queries to their oracle, or if εb = 0 and S
makes qS ≤ (m−2)/4t queries to its oracle, then there exists a commitment scheme
for m-bit messages which is (Sh, 1/4, 1/4)-secure for an honest sender (without ac-
cess to any oracle).
Applying Lemma 3.2.1, this implies the existence of a one-way function (without
access to any oracle).
Proof. We construct non-interactive commitment scheme (S̄, R̄) for m-bit messages,
following the intuition outlined earlier. The construction makes use of a procedure
SIM that simulates a random permutation in Πt,n as follows: SIMmaintains a list
L which is initially empty. To respond to a query a◦a′, where |a| = t and |a′| = n−t,
procedure SIM first checks whether there exists a value b such that (a, b) ∈ L. If so,
SIM returns b ◦ a′. Otherwise, it picks b ∈ {0, 1}t \
{
b̂ | ∃â : (â, b̂) ∈ L
}
uniformly
at random, adds (a, b) to L, and returns b ◦ a′. We let SIMy denote an execution
of SIM using random coins y.
Let H be a pairwise-independent family of functions from m-bit strings to
m-bit strings. Define S̄ as follows. On input a message M ∈ {0, 1}m, S̄ chooses
uniformly at random h ∈ H and values s1, r1, y1, s2, r2, y2. It then computes C1 =
〈SSIMy1 (M ; s1),RSIMy1 (r1)〉 and C2 = 〈SSIMy2 (h(M); s2),RSIMy2 (r2)〉, and out-
puts C1 ◦ C2 ◦ h.2 Decommitment, as usual, is done by having S̄ reveal M and
2The permutations simulated by SIM in the computations of C1, C2 will, in general, be dif-
ferent. The theorem can be strengthened (improving the bound on εh) by having SIM provide a
consistent simulation for both computations. We forgo this for simplicity.
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all the random coins used during the commitment phase. We claim that (S̄, R̄)
is (Sh, 1/4, 1/4)-secure for an honest sender. This follows from the following two
lemmata.
Lemma 3.2.3. (S̄, R̄) is (Sh, 1/4)-hiding.
Proof (of lemma). The hiding property of (S(·),R(·)) guarantees that for any π ∈ Πn
that is Sp-hard, for any circuit B of size at most Sh, and for any messages M0,M1 ∈
{0, 1}m, we have∣∣∣∣ PrC∈〈Sπ(M0),Rπ〉[B(C) = 0]− PrC∈〈Sπ(M1),Rπ〉[B(C) = 0]
∣∣∣∣ ≤ εh.
A straightforward hybrid argument shows that for any π1, π2 ∈ Πn that are Sp-hard,
for any circuit B of size at most Sh, and for any M0,M1 ∈ {0, 1}m, we have∣∣∣∣∣ Prh∈H
C1∈〈Sπ1 (M0),Rπ1 〉
C2∈〈Sπ2 (h(M0)),Rπ2 〉




[B(C1 ◦C2 ◦h) = 0]
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2εh.
Corollary 3.1.2 shows that a random permutation π ∈ Πt,n is Sp-hard except with
probability at most 2−S
5/2
p ≤ 2−Sp . Using a union bound and a simple averaging











∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2εh+21−Sp .










≤ 2εh + 21−Sp .
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But that precisely means that∣∣∣∣∣ PrC∈〈S̄ (M0),R∗ 〉[B(C) = 0]− PrC∈〈S̄ (M1),R∗ 〉[B(C) = 0]
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2εh + 21−Sp ≤ 1/4
for any R∗ and any circuit B of size at most Sh, where the last inequality uses the
assumption that εh ≤ 1/8 − 2−Sp . The hiding property therefore holds as claimed.

Lemma 3.2.4. (S̄, R̄) is 1/4-binding for an honest sender.
Proof (of lemma). For ease of notation, let
Com(M, s, r, y)
def
= 〈SSIMy(M ; s),RSIMy(r)〉.





 ∃M ′ ∈ {0, 1}m \M, s̄′ such that







∃M ′ ∈ {0, 1}m \M,h′, s′1, r′1, y′1, s′2, r′2, y′2 such that




1) ◦ Com(h′(M ′), s′2, r′2, y′2) ◦ h′







∃M ′ ∈ {0, 1}m \M, s′1, y′1, s′2, y′2 such that
Com(M ′, s′1, r1, y
′
1) = Com(M, s1, r1, y1)
∧
Com(h(M ′), s′2, r2, y
′
2) = Com(h(M), s2, r2, y2)
 ,
where in the last equality we use the fact that h′, r′1, r
′
2 and h, r1, r2 are explicit in
the view of R̄. Letting
Decom(M, s, r, y)
def
=
M ′ ∈ {0, 1}m
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∃s′, y′ such that









∃M ′ ∈ {0, 1}m \M such that
M ′ ∈ Decom(M, s1, r1, y1)
∧
h(M ′) ∈ Decom(h(M), s2, r2, y2)
 .
Let qS (resp., qR) denote the number of queries made by S (resp., R) to its
oracle3, and let q = qS + qR. For any integer q
∗, let Permq
∗
t denote the set of
“partial permutations” of size q∗ over t-bit strings; formally, Permq
∗
t contains all sets
P ⊆ {0, 1}t × {0, 1}t such that P contains exactly q∗ tuples and such that for all a
there exists at most one b with (a, b) ∈ P and at most one b′ such that(b′, a) ∈ P .
Let queries(M, s, r, y) ∈ Permqt denote the set of query/answer prefixes made by
either S or R to SIM during the computation of Com(M, s, r, y) (i.e., (a, b) ∈
queries(M, s, r, y) iff an oracle query a ◦ a′, by either S or R, is answered by SIM
with b ◦ a′ during the computation of Com(M, s, r, y)). Define queriesS(M, s, r, y)
(resp., queriesR(M, s, r, y)) similarly, where this refers exclusively to queries made
by S (resp., R).
Define r as good for P ∈ Permqt if there do not exist distinct M ′,M ′′, along
with s′, s′′, y′, y′′, such that
• Com(M ′, s′, r, y′) = Com(M ′′, s′′, r, y′′); and
• queries(M ′, s′, r, y′) = queries(M ′′, s′′, r, y′′) = P .
Say r is good if it is good for all P ∈ Permqt .
3Without loss of generality, we will assume that exactly qS (resp., qR) queries are always made.
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We first observe that for a good r, the set Decom(M, s, r, y) contains at most
|PermqSt | < 22tqS messages. Otherwise, by the pigeonhole principle, there exists
a PS ∈ PermqSt and distinct messages M ′,M ′′ ∈ Decom(M, s, r, y), along with
s′, s′′, y′, y′′, such that Com(M ′, s′, r, y′) = Com(M, s, r, y) = Com(M ′′, s′′, r, y′′) and
queriesS(M
′, s′, r, y′) = queriesS(M
′′, s′′, r, y′′) = PS . Notice also that queriesR(M
′, s′, r, y′) =
queriesR(M, s, r, y) = queriesR(M
′′, s′′, r, y′′), as these queries are explicit in the re-
ceiver’s views Com(M ′, s′, r, y′) = Com(M, s, r, y) = Com(M ′′, s′′, r, y′′). But then r
is not good for P
def
= PS ∪ queriesR(M, s, r, y), contradicting the assumption that r
is good for all P ∈ Permqt .
Fix some P ∈ Permqt , and let πP denote an arbitrary extension of P to a
permutation in Πt,n (in the natural way). We have
Pr
r
[r is not good for P ] = Pr
r

∃ distinct M ′,M ′′,∃s′, s′′, y′, y′′ such that
Com(M ′, s′, r, y′) = Com(M ′′, s′′, r, y′′)
∧




 ∃ distinct M ′,M ′′,∃s′, s′′ such that
〈SπP (M ′; s′),RπP (r)〉 = 〈SπP (M ′′; s′′),RπP (r)〉

≤ εb ,
by the binding property of (S(·),R(·)). Applying a union bound over all elements of
Permqt , we obtain:
Pr
r
[r is not good] < 22tq · εb.
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∃M ′ ∈ {0, 1}m \M such that
M ′ ∈ Decom(M, s1, r1, y1)







where the right term above represents an upper-bound on the probability that either









∃M ′ ∈ Decom(M, s1, r1, y1) \M,
∃M ′2 ∈ Decom(M2, s1, r1, y1) such that
h(M) = M2
∧










{|Decom(M, s1, r1, y1)| · |Decom(M2, s2, r2, y2)|}
 ,
using the pairwise independence ofH. Applying the bound on the size of Decom(M, s, r, y)
when r is good, we obtain
LeftTerm ≤ 2−2m · 2m · 24tqS = 24tqS−m.
Putting everything together, we have
NoBind ≤ 24tqS−m + 22tq+1 · εb .
If εb = 0 and qS ≤ (m − 2)/4t, it is easy to see that NoBind ≤ 1/4. When εb > 0
and q ≤ (m− 2− log(1 + 2m+1 · εb))/4t, we may observe that 24tqS−m + 22tq+1 · εb ≤
24tq · (2−m + 2εb) and hence NoBind ≤ 1/4 in this case as well. The claim follows. 
This completes the proof of the theorem.
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3.3 Upper Bounds on the Efficiency of Generic Commitment
Here, we briefly describe upper bounds on the efficiency of black-box construc-
tions of commitment schemes based on one-way permutations and compare them
with our lower bounds.
3.3.1 Perfectly-Binding Commitment
A perfectly-binding commitment scheme can be constructed from one-way
permutations using the approach of Blum [Blu82] along with the Goldreich-Levin
hard-core function paradigm [GL89]. Specifically, let h : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}` be a
hard-core function (see [Gol01]) for a one-way permutation π : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n.
To commit to a message M ∈ {0, 1}m, the sender first divides M into t = dm/`e
blocks N1, . . . , Nt, each of length `. Then, for each block Ni the sender chooses a
random si ∈ {0, 1}n and sends π(si), h(si)⊕Ni to the receiver. Since there exists a
hard-core function with ` = O(logS) for any S-hard π (and large enough n) [GL89]
(see also [Gol01, Section 2.5.3]), this construction requires O(m/ logS) invocations
of π, matching our bound.
3.3.2 Statistically-Binding Commitment for Single-Bit Messages
Naor [Nao91] showed a construction of a statistically-binding commitment
scheme for single-bit messages based on one-way functions. Let G : {0, 1}n →
{0, 1}n+k be a pseudorandom generator. The receiver first chooses a random r ∈
{0, 1}n+k and sends this value to the other party. The sender then commits to a bit
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b as follows: it chooses a random s ∈ {0, 1}n and sends G(s) if b = 0 and G(s)⊕ r
if b = 1. This scheme is binding with εb < 2
2n/2n+k = 2n−k.
Although a pseudorandom generator can be constructed from one-way func-
tions, we will examine the efficiency of the above scheme when G is based on an
S-hard one-way permutation π : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n so as to compare the efficiency of
the scheme to our bound. In this case, evaluating G requires O(k/ logS) invocations
of π [Yao82, BM84, GL89]. Viewing n as fixed, this is O(log ε−1b / logS) invocations
of π (for k polynomial in n).
3.3.3 Statistically-Binding Constructions for Longer Messages
There are a number of ways to extend the Naor scheme described above for
the case of m-bit messages. One obvious approach is to simply run the basic Naor
scheme in parallel for each bit of the message, having the sender/receiver use the
same value r for all these commitments. This gives a scheme which is binding with
εb < 2
n−k as before, but where the number of invocations of π required is now
O(mk/ logS).
A better approach, suggested in [Nao91], is to have the sender use the above
idea to commit to an n-bit seed s, and then additionally send G′(s) ⊕M (where
M is the sender’s message and G′ : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m is another pseudorandom
generator). This is still binding with εb < 2
n−k as before; the number of invocations
of π required, however, is O(nk/ logS+(m−n)/ logS) which is more efficient than
the previous approach when m > n.
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A third approach, suggested in [Nao91] as well, utilizes asymptotically good
error-correcting codes to extend the basic scheme. We present a simpler construction
here which achieves the same efficiency and which (to the best of our knowledge) has
not appeared before. Let G : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}` be a pseudorandom generator, where
` will be fixed later. The receiver begins by choosing random r1, . . . , rm ∈ {0, 1}`






⊕ G(s) (where Mi is the ith bit of M). As in the basic







































< 2m · 22n · 2−`.
Setting ` = n + m + k, we obtain a scheme that binds except with probability
εb < 2
n−k (as previously) and which requires only O((m + k)/ logS) invocations of
an S-hard permutation π.
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Chapter 4
Universally-Composable Two-Party Computation in Two Rounds
Here, we give a tight characterization of the round complexity of secure two-
party computation in the UC framework, as outlined in Section 1.3. The chapter
is organized as follows. In Section 4.1, we give an overview the UC framework,
and recall tools and assumptions used in our constructions. In Section 4.2, we
present a two-round, UC two-party computation protocol for the setting in which
parties may speak simultaneously in any given round; and a three-round protocol
for the task when parties take turns in transmitting their protocol messages. At
the end of the section, we observe that the protocols are round-optimal in their
respective communication models. In Section 4.3, we discuss how our results can be
applied to obtain a round-optimal UC blind signature scheme. In Section 4.4, we
briefly compare the application of our main protocol to evaluating policies on sets
of credentials with other approaches to the task.
4.1 Framework, Tools, and Assumptions
4.1.1 Preliminaries
In this chapter, we consider computational-indistinguishability by probabilis-
tic, polynomial-time algorithms taking non-uniform “advice”. The notion can easily
be shown equivalent to the notion of computational-indistinguishability by polynomial-
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sized circuit families, used in Chapter 3. It may also be shown to be strictly stronger
than the notion of computational-indistinguishability by polynomial-time algorithms
used in Chapter 2; see [Gol01, Section 3.2.4] for a discussion.
Let X = {X(k, z)}k∈N,z∈{0,1}∗ denote an ensemble of binary distributions,
where X(k, z) represents the output of a probabilistic, polynomial time (PPT) algo-
rithm on a security parameter k and advice z (the ensemble may be parameterized
by additional variables, and the algorithm may take additional inputs). We say that
ensembles X, Y are computationally indistinguishable, and write X
c
≈ Y , if for any
a ∈ N there exists ka ∈ N such that for all k > ka, for all z (and for all values any
additional variables parameterizing the ensemble may take), we have
|Pr[X(k, z) = 1]− Pr[Y (k, z) = 1]| < k−a.
4.1.2 Universally Composable Security
We consider secure computation within the Universal Composability frame-
work of Canetti [Can01], which we review here, most closely following the treatment
of [CLOS02]. Our focus is on the two-party, static corruption setting. We high-
light a few features of our definition that are standard but not universal: (1) The
real model offers authenticated communication and universal access to a common
reference string. Formally, this corresponds to the (FAUTH,FCRS)-hybrid model
of [Can01]. (2) Message delivery in both the real and ideal models is carried out by
the adversary (contrast with [Can01], where messages between the dummy parties
and the ideal functionality in the ideal model are delivered immediately). (3) The
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ideal functionality is not informed of party corruption by the ideal adversary. We
make this choice purely to simplify the exposition; our results extend to the more
general setting by the same means employed in [CLOS02] (see section 3.3 there).
4.1.2.1 Program and protocol syntax
Following [GMR89, Gol01], we use probabilistic, interactive Turing machines
(ITMs) to model programs to be run by parties in our execution environment. Input
and output tapes of ITMs are used to model inputs and outputs that are received
from and given to other programs running within a party, while communication
tapes are used to model messages sent to and received from the network. Hereafter,
when referring to a party, we mean the instance of the ITM it is running (when that
is clear from the context).
Protocols are specified by a set of ITMs, representing the programs to be run
by the participating parties. A protocol may also specify a distribution from which
it expects a common reference string (CRS) to be drawn. To simplify the exposition,
we assume that all protocols are such that the ITMs read their input tapes only at
the onset of their computation (this can easily be achieved by having an ITM copy
its input tape onto an internal work tape).
4.1.2.2 Defining the security of protocols
A protocol is said to be secure if its execution in a given real-life setting in
the presence of an adversary essentially “emulates” an ideal process capturing the
91
desired task. Below, we define the real-life setting, the ideal process and the notion
of protocol emulation.
Protocol execution in the real-life model. Execution in the real-life model in-
volves a protocol π, to be run by parties P1, P2; an adversary A; and an environment
Z with input z. All parties have a security parameter k ∈ N and are polynomial in
k.
On the onset of an execution, a CRS from the distribution specified by π (if
any) is chosen; the parties and the adversary have read access to the CRS throughout
the execution. Note that this may be realized in the FCRS-hybrid model of [Can01].
The execution consists of a sequence of activations, where in each activation, a
single party (be it P1, P2,A or Z) is running. The environment is activated first.
On its first activation, it may write a single message on the input tape of the
adversary, who’s activated next. The intent is to allow the (static) adversary to
corrupt parties on the onset of the execution (on corruption, see below). In each
subsequent activation, the environment may read the contents of the output tapes
of all uncorrupted parties and the adversary, and may write a message on the input
tape of a single uncorrupted party or the adversary (the environment may pass an
input to a corrupted party by sending it directly to the adversary, who controls it;
see below). Once the activation is complete, the entity whose input tape was written
to is activated next.
On its first activation, the adversary may corrupt one or both parties (or
neither). Upon corruption, the adversary gains access to all the tapes of a corrupted
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party and may arbitrarily act on its behalf in the future (the corrupted party is never
activated). The environment is notified of the identity of the corrupted parties, if
any (say, via a message that is added to the output tape of the adversary). Note that
corruption here corresponds to the notion of a static adversary of [Can01]. Once
the first activation is complete, the environment is reactivated. On any subsequent
activation, the adversary may read its input tape and the outgoing communication
tapes of all uncorrupted parties. It may then deliver a message to a party by
writing it on the party’s incoming communication tape. We make the following
restrictions on message delivery: if Pi is not corrupted, then the adversary may
deliver a message m from Pi to Pj if and only if m was previously written onto the
outgoing communication tape of Pi with Pj as the designated recipient; furthermore,
m may only be delivered once. Messages need not be delivered in the order in which
they were sent. Note that this models an asynchronous network with authenticated
links; formally, this corresponds to the FAUTH-hybrid model of [Can01]. If the
adversary delivered a message to some uncorrupted party in its activation then this
party is activated once the activation of the adversary is complete. Otherwise, the
environment is activated next.
Once an (uncorrupted) party is activated (either due to an input given by the
environment or due to a message delivered by the adversary), it follows its program
and may write local outputs on its output tape and send messages to other parties
by writing them on its outgoing communication tape. Once the activation of the
party is complete, the environment is activated.
The protocol execution ends when the environment completes an activation
93
without writing on the input tape of any entity. The output of the execution is the
output of the environment. We assume that this output consists of a single bit.
In summary, the order of activations is as follows. The environment is activated
first. On its first activation, it activates the adversary, who then returns control
to the environment. In subsequent activations, the environment may activate the
adversary or an uncorrupted party by writing on an input tape. If the adversary
is activated, it may return control to the environment, or it may activate a party
by delivering a message to it. After a party is activated, control is always returned
to the environment. We stress that at any point, only a single party is activated.
Furthermore the environment and the adversary can only activate one other entity
(thus only a single input is written by the environment per activation, and likewise
the adversary can only deliver a single message per activation).
Let REALπ,A,Z(k, z, r̄) denote the output of the environment Z when inter-
acting with adversary A and parties running protocol π on security parameter k,
input z and random tapes r̄ = rZ , rA, r1, r2 as described above (z and rZ for Z,
rA for A, ri for Pi). Let REALπ,A,Z(k, z) denote the random variable describing
REALπ,A,Z(k, z, r̄) when r̄ is uniformly chosen. Let REALπ,A,Z denote the ensemble
{REALπ,A,Z(k, z)}k∈N,z∈{0,1}∗ .
The ideal process. The ideal process involves an ideal functionality F , an ideal
process adversary (simulator) S, an environment Z with input z, and dummy parties
P̃1, P̃2. F is modeled as an ITM; Z and S have a security parameter k ∈ N and are
polynomial in k.
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As in protocol execution in the real-life model, the ideal process consists of a
sequence of activations, where in each activation, a single party (be it F ,S, P̃1, P̃2 or
Z) is running. The environment is activated first. As there, on its first activation,
the environment may write a single message on the input tape of the simulator, who’s
activated next. The intent is to allow the (static) simulator to corrupt parties on the
onset of the process. In each subsequent activation, the environment may read the
contents of the output tapes of all uncorrupted dummy parties and the simulator,
and may write a message on the input tape of a single, uncorrupted dummy party or
the simulator (the environment may pass an input to a corrupted dummy party by
sending it directly to the simulator, who controls it; see below). Once the activation
is complete, the entity whose input tape was written to is activated next.
The dummy parties are fixed and simple ITMs. Whenever a dummy party
is activated with an input, it writes it on its outgoing communication tape for the
ideal functionality; whenever a dummy party is activated due to the delivery of
some message (from the ideal functionality), it copies the message onto its output.
At the conclusion of a dummy party’s activation, the environment is activated.
The communication of the dummy parties is with the ideal functionality only. A
message between the two entities comprises of a header and contents. In this work,
as a convention, the first two fields of a message will constitute the header, and the
rest the contents. The first field of the header will describe the action being taken,
and the second will identify the session being run (see also Section 4.1.2.3).
When the ideal functionality is activated, it may read the contents of its in-
coming communication tape, and may send messages to the dummy parties and the
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simulator by writing these messages on its outgoing communication tape. Once the
activation of the ideal functionality is complete, the environment is activated next.
On its first activation, the simulator may corrupt one or both dummy par-
ties (or neither). Upon corruption, the simulator gains access to all the tapes of a
corrupted party and may arbitrarily act on its behalf in the future (the corrupted
party is never activated). The environment is notified of the identity of the cor-
rupted parties, if any (again, say via a message that is added to the output tape of
the simulator). Note that corruption corresponds to the notion of a static adversary.
Once the first activation is complete, the environment is reactivated. On any sub-
sequent activation, the simulator may read its input tape; the headers (but not the
contents) of messages on the outgoing communication tape of the ideal functionality
intended for uncorrupted dummy parties; the headers and contents of messages on
the outgoing communication tape of the ideal functionality intended for the simu-
lator or corrupted parties (note that the ideal process allows the simulator to learn
output values sent by the ideal functionality to corrupted parties as soon as they
are generated); and the headers (but not the contents) of messages on the outgoing
communication tapes of uncorrupted dummy parties intended for the ideal func-
tionality. The simulator may then deliver a message, either from a dummy party
to the ideal functionality, or from the ideal functionality to an uncorrupted dummy
party, by writing it onto the incoming communication tape of the recipient. As in
the execution in the real-life model, messages between uncorrupted dummy parties
and the ideal functionality may only be delivered if they appear on the outgoing
communication tape of the sender, are intended for the recipient, and have not been
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delivered before. There is no restriction on the order in which messages are deliv-
ered. If the simulator delivered a message to some uncorrupted dummy party or
to the ideal functionality in an activation, then that entity is activated once the
activation of the simulator is complete. Otherwise, the environment is activated
next.
As in the real-life model, the ideal process ends when the environment com-
pletes an activation without writing on the input tape of any entity. The output of
the protocol is the (single bit) output of the environment.
In summary, the order of activations is as follows. The environment is activated
first. On its first activation, it activates the simulator, who then returns control
to the environment. In subsequent activations, the environment may activate the
simulator or an uncorrupted dummy party by writing on an input tape. If the
simulator is activated, it may return control to the environment, or it may activate
either a dummy party or the ideal functionality by delivering a message to that
entity. After the activation of either an uncorrupted, dummy party or the ideal
functionality, control is always returned to the environment.
Let IDEALF ,S,Z(k, z, r̄) denote the output of the environment Z after interact-
ing in the ideal process with simulator S and the ideal functionality F , on security
parameter k, input z, and random input r̄ = rZ , rS , rF as described above (z and
rZ for Z; rS for S; rF for F). Let IDEALF ,S,Z(k, z) denote the random variable
describing IDEALF ,S,Z(k, z, r̄) when r̄ is chosen uniformly. Let IDEALF ,S,Z denote
the ensemble {IDEALF ,S,Z}k∈N,z∈{0,1}∗ .
We remark that the above definition of the ideal process slightly differs from
97
that of [Can01] in that there, messages between the dummy parties and the ideal
functionality are delivered immediately. In contrast, in this presentation, follow-
ing [CLOS02], the delivery is carried out by the simulator. Thus, in both the real
and ideal models, all message delivery is the responsibility of the adversary alone.
We note that our results can easily be stated in the model of “immediate delivery”
as defined in [Can01].
UC realizing an ideal functionality (emulation of the ideal process). We
say that a protocol π UC realizes an ideal functionality F if for any real-life adversary
A there exists an ideal-process adversary S such that no environment Z can tell
with non-negligible probability whether it is interacting with A and parties running
π in the real-life process, or with S and F in the ideal process. Formally:
Definition 4.1.1. Let F be an ideal functionality and let π be a two-party protocol.
We say that π UC realizes F if for any adversary A there exists an ideal-process
adversary S such that for any environment Z,
REALπ,A,Z
c
≈ IDEALF ,S,Z .
♦
4.1.2.3 The composition theorem
The hybrid model. In order to state the composition theorem, and in particular
in order to formalize the notion of a real-life protocol with access to multiple copies
of an ideal functionality, the hybrid model of computation with access to an ideal-
functionality F (the F-hybrid model, in short) is formalized. The model is identical
98
to the real-life model, with the following additions. On top of sending messages
to each other, the parties may send messages to and receive messages from an
unbounded number of copies of F . Each copy of F is identified via a unique
session identifier (SID); all messages addressed to this copy and all messages sent
by this copy carry the corresponding SID.
The communication between the parties and each one of the copies of F mimics
the ideal process. Specifically, when the adversary delivers a message from a party
to a copy of F with a particular SID, that copy of F is the next entity to be
activated. Furthermore, although the adversary in the hybrid model is responsible
for delivering the messages between the copies of F and the parties, it does not have
access to the contents of these messages.
The hybrid model does not specify how the SIDs are generated, nor does it
specify how parties “agree” on the SID of a certain protocol copy that is to be run
by them. These tasks are left to the protocol in the hybrid model. This convention
simplifies formulating ideal functionalities and designing protocols that UC realize
them, by freeing the functionality from the need to choose the SIDs and guarantee
their uniqueness (see [CLOS02] for further discussion).
Let EXECFπ,A,Z(k, z) denote the random variable describing the output of the
environment Z on input z, after interacting in the F -hybrid model with protocol
π and adversary A, analogously to the definition of REALπ,A,Z(k, z). (We stress
that here π is a hybrid of a real-life protocol with ideal evaluation calls to F .) Let






Replacing a call to F with a protocol invocation. Let π be a protocol in the
F -hybrid model, and let ρ be a protocol that UC-realizes F (with respect to some
class of adversaries). The composed protocol πρ is constructed by modifying the code
of each ITM in π so that the first message sent to each copy of F is replaced with
an invocation of a new copy of ρ with fresh random coins, with the same SID, and
with the contents of that message as input. Each subsequent message to that copy
of F is replaced with an activation of the corresponding copy of ρ, with the contents
of that message given to ρ as new input. Each input value generated by a copy of ρ
is treated as a message received from the corresponding copy of F (see [Can01] for
more details). If ρ is a protocol in the real-life model then so is πρ. If ρ is a protocol
in some G-hybrid model, then so is πρ.
The composition theorem. In its general form, the composition theorem essen-
tially states that if ρ UC realizes F in the G-hybrid model for some functionality
G, then an execution of the composed protocol πρ, running in the G-hybrid model,
“emulates” an execution of π in the F -hybrid model. That is, for any adversary A
in the G-hybrid model there exists an adversary S in the F -hybrid model such that
no environment machine Z can tell with non-negligible probability whether it is
interacting with A and πρ in the G-hybrid model or it is interacting with S and π in
the F -hybrid model. A corollary of the general theorem states that if π UC-realizes
some functionality I in the F -hybrid model, and ρ UC-realizes F in the G-hybrid
model, then πρ UC realizes I in the G-hybrid model. Formally:
Theorem 4.1.2 ([Can01]). Let F ,G, I be ideal functionalities. Let π be a two-party
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protocol in the F-hybrid model, and let ρ be a two-party protocol that UC realizes
F in the G-hybrid model. Then for any adversary A in the G-hybrid model, there





In particular, if π UC realizes functionality I in the F-hybrid model then πρ UC
realizes I in the G-hybrid model.
4.1.2.4 Non-reactive functionalities
Our work deals with non-reactive functionalities. That is, functionalities that
hold until they receive an input from each of the participating parties (in any order),
then compute outputs (for any of the parties) and halt. We model a non-reactive
functionality F with a family of circuits {Fk}k∈N. As a convention, we assume that
F expects an input message with an action-description header field F -inputi from
party Pi, and produces an output message with an action-description header field
F -outputi for party Pi.
4.1.3 Universally Composable Zero Knowledge
Here, we overview the ideal zero-knowledge functionality FZK, following the
treatment of [CLOS02], and discuss a non-interactive protocol that UC-realizes it
in the presence of static adversaries. Looking ahead, our round-efficient, two-party
computation constructions will be presented in the FZK-hybrid model.
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In the zero-knowledge functionality, parameterized by a relation R, a prover
sends the functionality a statement x to be proven, along with a witness w. In
response, the functionality forwards the statement x to a verifier if and only if
R(x,w) = 1 (i.e., if and only if it is a correct statement). The functionality is
presented in Figure 4.1.
Functionality FZK
FZK proceeds as follows, running with a prover P , a verifier V and an adversary
S, and parameterized with a relation R:
• Upon receiving (ZK-prover, sid, x, w) from P , do: if R(x,w) = 1, then send
(ZK-proof, sid, x) to V and S and halt. Otherwise, halt.
Figure 4.1: The ideal Universally-Composable zero-knowledge functionality.
We note the following about the above formulation. First, in actuality, we
have a proof of knowledge here, in that the verifier is assured that the prover knows
w (and has explicitly sent w to the functionality), rather than just assured that such
a w exists. Second, the functionality is defined so that only correct statements (i.e.,
values x such that R(x,w) = 1) are received by the verifier; incorrect statements are
ignored by the functionality, and the verifier receives no notification that an attempt
at cheating in the proof took place. This convention simplifies the description and
analysis of our protocols. We note however that it is not essential; error messages
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can be added to the functionality (an realized) in a straightforward manner.
For the case of static adversaries, De Santis et al. [DDO+01] provide a non-
interactive protocol (i.e., consists of a single message from the prover to the verifier)
that UC realizes FZK for any NP relation (see also a discussion in [CLOS02, Section
6]); the protocol is given in the CRS model and assumes the existence of enhanced
trapdoor-permutations (see [Gol04, Appendix C.1] for a discussion of this assump-
tion).
4.1.4 Yao’s “Garbled Circuit” Technique
Our protocol uses as a building block the “garbled-circuit” technique of Yao [Yao86].
We follow [KO04] in abstracting the technique, and consider those aspects of it which
are necessary for our proofs of security; for the full construction and proof of security
(when the participating parties are assumed to be honest-but-curious, and in the
stand-alone setting), see [LP04].
Let Fk be a description of a two-input/single-output circuit whose inputs and
output are of length k (the technique easily extends to lengths polynomial in k).
Yao’s results provide two PPT algorithms:
1. Yao1 is a randomized algorithm which takes as input a security parameter
k ∈ N, a circuit Fk, and a string y ∈ {0, 1}k. It outputs a garbled circuit
Circuit and input-wire labels {Zi,σ}i∈{1,...,k},σ∈{0,1}.
2. Yao2 is a deterministic algorithm which takes as input a security parameter
k ∈ N, a “garbled-circuit” Circuit and values {Zi}i∈{1,...,k} where Zi ∈ {0, 1}
k.
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It outputs either an invalid symbol ⊥, or a value v ∈ {0, 1}k.
We informally describe how the above algorithms may be used for secure com-
putation when the participating parties are honest-but-curious. Let P1 hold input
x = x1 . . . xk ∈ {0, 1}k, P2 hold input y ∈ {0, 1}k, and assume P1 is to obtain the
output Fk(x, y). First, P2 computes (Circuit, {Zi,σ}i,σ)
R← Yao1(k, Fk, y) and sends
Circuit to P1. Then the players engage in k instances of Oblivious Transfer : in the
ith instance, P1 enters with input xi, P2 enters with input (Zi,0, Zi,1), and P1 obtains
Zi
def
= Zi,xi (additionally, P2 “learns nothing” about xi, and P1 “learns nothing”
about Zi,1−xi). P1 then computes v ← Yao2(Circuit, {Zi}i), and outputs v.
With the above in mind, we describe the properties required of Yao1,Yao2. We
first require correctness : for any Fk, y, any output (Circuit, {Zi,σ}i,σ) of Yao1(k, Fk, y)
and any x, we have Fk(x, y) = Yao2(k,Circuit, {Zi,xi}i). The algorithms also satisfy
the following notion of security : there exists a PPT simulator Yao-Sim which takes
k, Fk, x, v as inputs, and outputs Circuit and a set of k input-wire labels {Zi}i;





R← Yao1(k, Fk, y) :





v = Fk(x, y) :





4.1.5 The Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) Assumption
We use a two-round oblivious transfer (OT) protocol as a building block in our
constructions; any OT protocol based on smooth projective hashing for hard subset-
membership problems per Tauman’s framework [Tau05] will do. To simplify the
exposition, we describe our constructions in terms of a protocol based on the Deci-
sional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption [DH76] which we recall here; we list known,
alternative assumptions on which suitable OT protocols may be based in Section 4.2.
A group generator GroupGen is a PPT which on input k ∈ N outputs a de-
scription of a cyclic group G of prime order q, the order q and a generator g ∈ G.
Looking ahead, we will want to associate messages of length k with group elements;
for simplicity we thus assume that |q| ≥ k (alternatively, we could use hashing).
Definition 4.1.3. We say the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem is hard for













The following claim follows from the above definition via a simple hybrids
argument.
Claim 4.1.4. If the DDH problem is hard for GroupGen, then for any PPT algorithm
A, ensemble (1) above is also computationally indistinguishable from:
(2’)
{





4.2 Round-Optimal, Universally Composable Two-Party Computa-
tion
In this section, we show a two-round protocol for Universally-Composable
(UC) two-party computation. We reach our construction in two steps:
• First, we describe a two-round protocol, where parties take turns in speaking,
for securely computing functionalities that provide output to only one of the
participating parties. Using standard techniques, our protocol may be com-
piled into one that securely computes functionalities providing output to both
parties at the cost of an additional communication round. The protocol is of
interest in its own right (in Section 4.3, we use it to obtain a two-round UC
blind-signature scheme, matching a recent result by Fischlin [Fis06]), but also
serves as a stepping stone towards our main construction.
• We show how to bind and run two instances of our first protocol “in parallel”,
once in each “direction”, so as to obtain a two-round protocol, where both
parties speak in each round, for securely computing functionalities that provide
output to both participating parties. We stress that our security analysis takes
into account adversaries who may, in particular, wait to receive a message from
their partner before sending their own in any given round (so called “rushing”
adversaries).
At the end of the section, we observe that two rounds of communication are necessary
for UC two-party computation when parties may speak simultaneously in any given
106
round; and that three rounds are necessary for the task when parties need to take
turns in sending their protocol messages.
Our constructions use UC zero-knowledge, Yao’s garbled circuit technique and
two-message oblivious transfer (OT) as building blocks. As mentioned earlier, any
OT protocol based on smooth projective hashing for hard subset-membership prob-
lems per Tauman’s framework [Tau05] will do. We stress that such OT protocols
satisfy a weaker notion of security than the one needed here; we use zero-knowledge
to lift the security guarantees to the level we need. To simplify the description of
our protocols, we use a protocol from the framework based on the DDH assump-
tion, simplifying a construction due to Naor and Pinkas [NP01]. We remark that
other protocols conforming to Tauman’s framework are known to exist under the
DDH assumption [AIR01], under the Nth-residuosity assumption and under both the
Quadratic-Residuosity assumption and the Extended Riemann hypothesis [Tau05].
4.2.1 A Two-Round Protocol for Single-Output Functionalities
Let F = {Fk}k∈N be a non-reactive, polynomial-sized, two-party functionality
that provides output to a single party, say P1. To simplify matters, we assume
that F is deterministic; randomized functionalities can be handled using standard
tools [Gol04, Prop. 7.4.4]. Without loss of generality, assume that Fk takes two k-
bit inputs and produces a k-bit output (the protocol easily extends to input/output
lengths polynomial in k). Let GroupGen be a group generator as in Section 4.1.5; re-
call our simplifying assumption that the order q of the group generated by GroupGen
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on security parameter k is such that |q| ≥ k.
In this section, we describe a two round protocol for computing such F in the
UC setting. Informally, our protocol proceeds as follows. Recall that in oblivious
transfer, a receiver chooses and obtains one of two strings held by a sender, such
that the sender “learns nothing” about the receiver’s choice (preserving the receiver’s
privacy) while the receiver “learns nothing” about the second string (preserving the
sender’s privacy). The first round of our protocol is used to set up k instances of
oblivious transfer. The second round is used to communicate a “garbled circuit” per
Yao’s construction, and for completing the oblivious-transfer of circuit input-wire
labels that correspond to P1’s input (cf. Section 4.1.4).
To gain more intuition, we sketch a single oblivious transfer instance, assuming
both parties are honest (the actual construction accounts for possibly malicious
behavior by the parties with the aid of zero-knowledge). Let G be a group and g a
generator, provided by GroupGen as above. To obtain the label corresponding to an
input xi for wire i, P1 picks elements a, b uniformly at random from G and sends P2
a tuple (u = ga, v = gb, w = gc), where c is set to ab if xi = 0, to (ab− 1) otherwise.
Note that if the DDH problem is hard for GroupGen, P2 will not be able to tell a
tuple generated for xi = 0 from one generated for xi = 1, preserving P1’s privacy.
Let Zi,σ be the label corresponding to input bit σ for wire i. P2 selects r0, s0, r1, s1
uniformly at random from G, and sends P1 two pairs as follows:
(K0 = u
r0 · gs0 , C0 = wr0 · vs0 · Zi,0) ; and
(K1 = u
r1 · gs1 , C1 = (g · w)r1 · vs1 · Zi,1).
It is easy to verify that P1 can obtain Zi,xi by computing K
−b
xi
· Cxi . Moreover, it
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can be shown that the tuple (K1−xi , C1−xi) is uniformly distributed (over the choice
of r1−xi , s1−xi), and therefore P1 “learns nothing” (information-theoretically) about
the label corresponding to input (1− xi) for wire i, preserving P2’s privacy.
In the following, we describe our two-round protocol πF for UC realizing F in
the FZK-hybrid model. In our description, we always let i range from 1 to k and σ
range from 0 to 1.
Common Reference String: On security parameter k ∈ N, the CRS is (G, q, g) R←
GroupGen(k).
First Round: P1 on inputs k ∈ N, x = x1 . . . xk ∈ {0, 1}k and sid, proceeds as
follows:
1. For every i, chooses ai, bi uniformly at random from Zq, sets:
ci =

aibi xi = 0
aibi − 1 otherwise,
and lets ui = g
ai , vi = g
bi , wi = g
ci .
2. P1 sends
(ZK-prover, sid ◦ 1, ({ui, vi, wi}i , (G, q, g), k), (x, {ai, bi}i))
to F1ZK, where F1ZK is parameterized by the relation:
R1 =

(({ui, vi, wi}i , (G, q, g), k), (x, {ai, bi}i))
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∀i, ui = gai , vi = gbi , wi = gci ,
where ci =

aibi xi = 0
aibi − 1 otherwise

and is set up such that P1 is the prover and P2 is the verifier.
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Second Round: P2, on inputs k ∈ N, y = y1 . . . yk ∈ {0, 1}k and sid, and upon
receiving
(ZK-proof, sid ◦ 1, ({ui, vi, wi}i , (G
′, q′, g′), k′))
from F1ZK, first verifies that G ′ = G, q′ = q, g′ = g and k′ = k. If any of these
conditions fail, P2 ignores the message. Otherwise, it proceeds as follows:
1. Generates a “garbled circuit” (cf. Section 4.1.4) for Fk, based on its own input
y. This involves choosing random coins Ω and computing (Circuit, {Zi,σ}i,σ)←
Yao1(k, Fk, y; Ω).
2. For every i and σ, chooses ri,σ, si,σ uniformly at random from Zq, and sets:
Ki,0 = u
ri,0







i · gsi,1 , Ci,1 = (g · wi)ri,1 · v
si,1
i · Zi,1.
3. SendsZK-prover, sid ◦ 2,
 Circuit, {Ki,σ, Ci,σ}i,σ



































and is set up such that P2 is the prover and P1 is the verifier.
Output Computation: P1, upon receipt of message
(ZK-proof, sid ◦ 2, (Circuit, {Ki,σ, Ci,σ}i,σ , (G
′, q′, g′), k′, {u′i, v′i, w′i}i))
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from F2ZK, first verifies that G ′ = G, q′ = q, g′ = g, k′ = k and {u′i, v′i, w′i}i =
{ui, vi, wi}i. If any of these conditions fail, P1 ignores the message. Otherwise, it
completes the protocol by computing Zi
def
= K−bii,xi ·Ci,xi , computing v ← Yao2(k,Circuit, {Zi}i)
and reporting v as output if v 6= ⊥.
Concrete round complexity. When composed with the non-interactive protocol
of De Santis et al. [DDO+01] UC-realizing FZK, our protocol takes two commu-
nication rounds. Its security now additionally rests on the existence of enhanced
trapdoor permutations.
Security. We forgo the analysis here — the protocol may be viewed as a degenerate
version of the construction we present and analyze next.
Compiling the protocol into one computing two-output functionalities.
The protocol may be compiled into one that securely computes functionalities pro-
viding output to both parties at the cost of an additional round of communication
using standard techniques [Gol04, Prop. 7.2.11].










be a non-reactive, polynomial-sized, two-party
functionality such that P1 wishes to obtain F
1
k (x, y) and P2 wishes to obtain F
2
k (x, y)
when P1 holds x and P2 holds y. Without loss of generality, assume once more that
F is deterministic; that x, y and the outputs of F 1k , F 2k are k-bit strings; and that
the order q of a group generated by GroupGen on security parameter k is such that
|q| ≥ k; see Section 4.2.1.
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The protocol of the preceding section provides means to securely compute a
functionality that provides output to one of the parties, in two rounds. To securely-




k ), we run one instance of that
protocol such that P1 receives F
1
k (with a first-round message originating from P1
and a second-round message from P2), and a second instance such that P2 receives
F 2k (with a first-round message originating from P2 and a second-round message
from P1); if we allow the parties to transmit messages simultaneously in any given
round, this yields a two-round protocol. All that’s left to ensure is that each party
enters both instances of the protocol with the same input; we have the relation pa-
rameterizing the second-round zero-knowledge functionality enforce this condition1.
Below, we describe our two-round protocol πF for UC realizing F in the FZK-
hybrid model when parties are allowed to send messages simultaneously in any given
round. We describe our protocol from the perspective of P1; P2 behaves analogously
(i.e., the protocol is symmetric). In the description, we always let i range from 1 to
k and σ range from 0 to 1.
Common Reference String: On security parameter k ∈ N, the CRS is (G, q, g) R←
GroupGen(k).
First Round: P1 on inputs k ∈ N, x = x1 . . . xk ∈ {0, 1}k and sid, proceeds as
1Alternatively, we can make the following modifications to the protocol of the preceding section:
each party will add a commitment to its input to its original protocol message, and modify its
zero-knowledge assertion to reflect that it has constructed the original message with an input that
is consistent with the commitment. Two instances of this protocol can now be run in parallel as
above without further modifications (note that the second-round commitments become redundant).
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follows:
1. For every i, chooses ai, bi uniformly at random from Zq, sets:
ci =

aibi xi = 0
aibi − 1 otherwise,
and lets ui = g
ai , vi = g
bi , wi = g
ci .
2. Sends
(ZK-prover, sid ◦ 1 ◦ P1, ({ui, vi, wi}i , (G, q, g), k), (x, {ai, bi}i))
to F1,P1→P2ZK , where F
1,P1→P2
ZK is parameterized by the relation:
R1 =

(({ui, vi, wi}i , (G, q, g), k), (x, {ai, bi}i))
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∀i, ui = gai , vi = gbi , wi = gci ,
where ci =

aibi xi = 0
aibi − 1 otherwise

and is set up such that P1 is the prover and P2 is the verifier.
Second Round: Upon receiving the symmetric first-round message
(ZK-proof, sid ◦ 1 ◦ P2, ({ūi, v̄i, w̄i}i , (G
′, q′, g′), k′))
from F1,P2→P1ZK (defined analogously to F
1,P1→P2
ZK using the relation R1, but set up
such that P2 is the prover and P1 is the verifier), P1 verifies that G ′ = G, q′ = q, g′ = g
and k′ = k. If any of these conditions fail, P1 ignores the message. Otherwise, it
proceeds as follows:
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1. Generates a “garbled circuit” (cf. Section 4.1.4) for F 2k , based on its own input
x. This involves choosing random coins Ω and computing (Circuit, {Zi,σ}i,σ)←
Yao1(k, F
2
k , x; Ω).
2. For every i and σ, chooses ri,σ, si,σ uniformly at random from Zq, and sets:
Ki,0 = ū
ri,0







i · gsi,1 , Ci,1 = (g · w̄i)ri,1 · v̄
si,1
i · Zi,1.
3. SendsZK-prover, sid ◦ 2 ◦ P1,

Circuit, {Ki,σ, Ci,σ}i,σ









to F2,P1→P2ZK , where F
2,P1→P2
















(Circuit, {Zi,σ}i,σ) = Yao1(k, F
2











i · gsi,1 , Ci,1 = (g · w̄i)ri,1 · v̄
si,1
i · Zi,1
∧ ∀i, ui = gai , vi = gbi , wi = gci ,
where ci =

aibi xi = 0
aibi − 1 otherwise

and is set up such that P1 is the prover and P2 is the verifier.














from F2,P2→P1ZK (defined analogously to F
2,P1→P2
ZK using the relation R2, but set up
such that P2 is the prover and P1 is the verifier), P1 verifies that G ′ = G, q′ = q, g′ =
g, k′ = k, that {u′i, v′i, w′i}i = {ui, vi, wi}i and that {ū′i, v̄′i, w̄′i}i = {ūi, v̄i, w̄i}i. If
any of these conditions fail, P1 ignores the message. Otherwise, it completes the
protocol by computing Z̄i
def






reporting v as output if v 6= ⊥.
Concrete round complexity. When composed with the non-interactive protocol
of De Santis et al. [DDO+01] realizing FZK, the protocol takes two rounds of commu-
nication; its security now additionally requires the existence of enhanced trapdoor
permutations.
Theorem 4.2.1. Assuming that the DDH problem is hard for GroupGen, the above
protocol UC-realizes F in the FZK-hybrid model (in the presence of static adver-
saries).
Let A be a (static) adversary operating against πF in the FZK-hybrid model.
To prove the theorem, we construct a simulator S such that no environment Z can
tell with a non-negligible probability whether it is interacting with A and P1, P2
running πF in the FZK-hybrid model or with S and P̃1, P̃2 in the ideal process for F .
S will internally run a copy of A, “simulating” for it an execution of πF in the FZK-
hybrid model (by simulating an environment, a CRS, ideal FZK functionalities and
parties P1, P2) that matches S’s view of the ideal process; S will use A’s actions to
guide its own in the ideal process. We refer to an event as occurring in the internal
simulation if it happens within the execution environment that S simulates for A.
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We refer to an event as occurring in the external process if it happens within the
ideal process, in which S is participating.
For clarity, we group S’s actions according to the subset of parties that A has
corrupted. Recall that S is given a security parameter k ∈ N. S proceeds as follows:
Initial activation: S sets the (simulated) CRS to be (G, q, g) R← GroupGen(k). It
copies the input value written by Z on its own input tape onto A’s input tape
and activates A. If A corrupts party Pi (in the internal simulation), S corrupts
P̃i (in the external process). When A completes its activation, S copies the
output value written by A on its output tape to S’s own output tape, and
ends its activation.
P2 only is corrupted: Upon activation, S copies the input value written by Z on its
own input tape onto A’s input tape. In addition, if P̃1 has added a message
(F -input1, sid, ·) for F to its outgoing communication tape (in the external
process; recall that S can only read the public headers of messages on the
outgoing communication tapes of uncorrupted dummy parties), S, for every
i, chooses ai, bi uniformly at random from Zq, sets ui = gai , vi = gbi , wi = gaibi
for future use, and adds a message (ZK-prover, sid ◦ 1 ◦ P1,⊥,⊥) for F1,P1→P2ZK
to P1’s outgoing communication tape (in the internal simulation; recall that A
will only be able to read the public header of a message intended for FZK on
the outgoing communication tape of an uncorrupted party in the FZK-hybrid
model). S then activates A.
Upon completion of A’s activation, S acts as follows:
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1. If A delivered the message (ZK-prover, sid ◦ 1 ◦ P1,⊥,⊥) from P1 to
F1,P1→P2ZK (in the internal simulation), S adds the message
(ZK-proof, sid ◦ 1 ◦ P1, ({ui, vi, wi}i , (G, q, g), k))
for P2 and A to F1,P1→P2ZK ’s outgoing communication tape (in the internal
simulation). Informally, S constructs the message from F1,P1→P2ZK to P2
and A (in the internal simulation) in accordance with πF , except that it
always lets wi be g
aibi .
2. If A delivered a message
(ZK-prover, sid ◦ 1 ◦ P2, ({ūi, v̄i, w̄i}i , (G






from P2 to F1,P2→P1ZK (in the internal simulation), S verifies that
(({ūi, v̄i, w̄i}i , (G






If the verification fails, S does nothing. Otherwise, S adds the message
(ZK-proof, sid ◦ 1 ◦ P2, ({ūi, v̄i, w̄i}i , (G
′, q′, g′), k′))
for P1 and A to F1,P2→P1ZK ’s outgoing communication tape (in the internal
simulation), and delivers the message (F -input2, sid, y) from (the cor-
rupted) P̃2 to F (in the external simulation). S records the values y and
{ūi, v̄i, w̄i}i.
3. If A delivered the message
(ZK-proof, sid ◦ 1 ◦ P2, ({ūi, v̄i, w̄i}i , (G
′, q′, g′), k′))
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from F1,P2→P1ZK to P1 (in the internal simulation), S first verifies that
P̃1 has a message (F -input1, sid, ·) for F on its outgoing communication
tape (in the external process) and that G ′ = G, q′ = q, g′ = g and k′ = k.
If any of these fail, S does nothing. Otherwise, it adds the message
(ZK-prover, sid◦2◦P1,⊥,⊥) for F2,P1→P2ZK to P1’s outgoing communication
tape (in the internal simulation), delivers (F -input1, sid, ·) from P̃1 to F
(in the external process), and notes to itself that the Round-1 message
from F1,P2→P1ZK to P1 (in the internal simulation) has been delivered. Note
that once the activation of S will be complete, F will be in possession of
both its inputs and will be activated next (in the external process).
4. If A delivered the message (ZK-prover, sid ◦ 2 ◦ P1,⊥,⊥) from P1 to
F2,P1→P2ZK , S proceeds as follows. First note that at this point, we are
guaranteed that two inputs were delivered to F and that F has been ac-
tivated subsequently (in the external process); therefore, F has written
a message (F -output2, sid, v) for P̃2 on its outgoing communication tape
(in the external process; note that S may read the contents of a mes-
sage from F to a corrupted party). Also note that at this point, S has
recorded values y and {ūi, v̄i, w̄i}i sent by (the corrupted) P2 in its first-
round message to F1,P2→P1ZK . S produces a simulated “garbled circuit”
and input-wire labels using F 2k , y and v (cf. Section 4.1.4) by computing
(Circuit, {Zi}i)
R← Yao-Sim(k, F 2k , y, v). For every i, it chooses ri,yi , si,yi
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i · Zi if yi = 0
(g · w̄i)ri,yi · v̄
si,yi
i · Zi otherwise,
and sets Ki,1−yi , Ci,1−yi to be elements selected uniformly at random from
G. It then adds the messageZK-proof, sid ◦ 2 ◦ P1,
Circuit, {Ki,σ, Ci,σ}i,σ
(G, q, g), k, {ūi, v̄i, w̄i}i
{ui, vi, wi}i

for P2 andA to the outgoing communication tape of F2,P1→P2ZK . Informally,
S constructs the message in accordance with πF , except that it uses
simulated circuit and input wire labels, and sets {Ki,1−yi , Ci,1−yi}i to be
uniform elements in G.

















































(G ′, q′, g′), k′, {u′i, v′i, w′i}i
{ū′i, v̄′i, w̄′i}i

for P1 and A to F2,P2→P1ZK ’s outgoing communication tape (in the internal
simulation).






(G ′, q′, g′), k′, {u′i, v′i, w′i}i
{ū′i, v̄′i, w̄′i}i

from F2,P2→P1ZK to P1 (in the internal simulation), S first checks whether
a Round-1 message from F1,P2→P1ZK to P1 (in the internal simulation) has
been delivered, per Item 3 above; if not, S does nothing. Otherwise,
we are guaranteed that two inputs were delivered to F , and that F has
subsequently been activated and written a message (F -output1, sid, ·) for
P̃1 on its outgoing communication tape (in the external process). S
verifies that G ′ = G, q′ = q, g′ = g, k′ = k, that {u′i, v′i, w′i}i = {ui, vi, wi}i
and that {ū′i, v̄′i, w̄′i}i = {ūi, v̄i, w̄i}i (intuitively, the checks, along with
those performed by S on behalf of F2,P2→P1ZK per Item 5 above, guarantee
that (the corrupted) P2 has used the same input consistently in both
rounds, i.e., that y′ = y); if so, S delivers the message (F -output1, sid, ·)
from F to P̃1 (in the external process).
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After performing one of the above (if any), S copies the output value written
by A on its output tape to S’s own output tape, and ends its activation.
P1 only is corrupted: Symmetric to the case where P2 only is corrupted.
P1, P2 are both corrupted: Informally, S need only pass messages between Z and A,
and simulate FZK for A. Specifically, upon activation, S copies the input value
written by Z on its own input tape (in the external process) onto A’s input
tape and activates A (in the internal simulation). Upon the completion of A’s
activation, S proceeds as follows: if A delivered a message (ZK-prover, sid ◦
` ◦ Pi, x̂, ŵ) from Pi to F
`,Pi→Pj
ZK , S verifies that (x̂, ŵ) ∈ R`. If the verification
fails, S does nothing; otherwise, it adds the message (ZK-proof, sid ◦ ` ◦ Pi, x̂)
for Pj and A to the outgoing communication tape of F
`,Pi→Pj
ZK . S copies the
output value written by A on its output tape to S’s own output tape, and
ends its activation.
Neither P1 nor P2 is corrupted: Informally, S need only pass messages between Z
and A, and deliver messages in the external process in accordance to mes-
sage delivery by A in the internal simulation. Specifically, upon activation,
S copies the input value written by Z on its own input tape onto A’s input
tape. In addition, if P̃i has added a message (F -inputi, sid, ·) for F to its
outgoing communication tape (in the external process; recall that S can only
read the public headers of messages on the outgoing communication tapes of
uncorrupted dummy parties), S adds a message (ZK-prover, sid ◦ 1 ◦ Pi,⊥,⊥)
for F1,Pi→PjZK to Pi’s outgoing communication tape (in the internal simulation;
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recall that A will only be able to read the public header of a message in-
tended for FZK on the outgoing communication tape of an uncorrupted party
in the FZK-hybrid model), where Pj is Pi’s partner (i.e., Pj = P(3−i)). S then
activates A.
Upon completion of A’s activation, S acts as follows:
1. IfA delivered the message (ZK-prover, sid◦1◦Pi,⊥,⊥) from Pi to F
1,Pi→Pj
ZK
(in the internal simulation), S adds the message (ZK-proof, sid◦1◦Pi,⊥)




2. IfA delivered the message (ZK-proof, sid◦1◦Pi,⊥) from F
1,Pi→Pj
ZK to Pj (in
the internal simulation), note first thatAmust have delivered the message
(ZK-prover, sid ◦ 1 ◦Pi,⊥,⊥) from Pi to F
1,Pi→Pj
ZK (in the internal simula-
tion) per Item 1 above, and so it must be the case that P̃i has a message
(F -inputi, sid, ·) for F on its outgoing communication tape (in the exter-
nal process). S verifies that P̃j has added a message (F -inputj, sid, ·) for
F to its outgoing communication tape (in the external process). If not, S
does nothing. Otherwise, it adds the message (ZK-prover, sid◦2◦Pj,⊥,⊥)
for F2,Pj→PiZK to the outgoing communication tape of Pj (in the internal
simulation), delivers the message (F -inputi, sid, ·) from P̃i to F (in the
external process), and notes to itself that the Round-1 message from
F1,Pi→PjZK to Pj (in the internal simulation) has been delivered.




(in the internal simulation), S adds the message (ZK-proof, sid◦2◦Pi,⊥)




4. If A delivered the message (ZK-proof, sid ◦ 2 ◦ Pi,⊥) from F
2,Pi→Pj
ZK to
Pj, note first that A must have delivered the message (ZK-prover, sid ◦
2 ◦ Pi,⊥,⊥) from Pi to F
2,Pi→Pj
ZK (in the internal simulation) per Item 3
above, and so that the Round-1 message from F1,Pj→PiZK to Pi (in the in-
ternal simulation) has been delivered as well, per Item 2; therefore, S
must have delivered the message (F -inputj, sid, ·) from P̃j to F (in the
external process) per Item 2. S verifies that the Round-1 message from
F1,Pi→PjZK to Pj (in the internal simulation) has been delivered per Item 2;
if not, S does nothing. Otherwise, we are guaranteed that S has deliv-
ered the message (F -inputi, sid, ·) from P̃i to F (in the external process)
per Item 2 as well. As both inputs were delivered to F and F has been
subsequently activated (in the external process), F has written a mes-
sage (F -outputj, sid,⊥) for P̃j on its outgoing communication tape (in
the external process). S delivers (F -outputj, sid,⊥) from F to P̃j (in the
external process).
After performing one of the above (if any), S copies the output value written
by A on its output tape to S’s own output tape, and ends its activation.
This completes the description of S. All that is left to be shown is that no environ-
ment Z can tell with a non-negligible probability whether it is interacting with A
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and P1, P2 running πF in the FZK-hybrid model or with S and P̃1, P̃2 in the ideal
process for F . We focus on the case where A corrupts one of the parties, say P2.
The case where A corrupts P1 is symmetric, and the cases where either or neither
of the parties are corrupted are straightforward. Formally, we claim the following:
Lemma 4.2.2. Let A be a (static) adversary that corrupts P2 only, and let S be as
above. Then for any Z,
EXECFZKπF ,A,Z
c
≈ IDEALF ,S,Z . (4.1)
Loosely speaking, when P2 only is corrupted, the following differences between
a real-life execution of πF among P1, P2 in the FZK-hybrid model and the ideal
process for F among P̃1, P̃2 may be noted: (1) in the former, P1 computes its
output based on a “garbled circuit” and obliviously-transferred input-wire labels
corresponding to its input, received in the second round of the protocol, while in
the latter, P̃1 receives its output from F based on the value y that S obtained
while simulating F1,P2→P1ZK for the first round of the protocol; (2) in the former, the
first round message from F 1,P1→P2ZK to P2 contains values wi = g
ci where ci = aibi
when xi = 0, ci = aibi − 1 when xi = 1; while in the latter, the message (in the
internal simulation) contains wi = g
aibi for all i; (3) in the former, the second-
round message from F2,P1→P2ZK to P2 contains values Ki,(1−yi), Ci,(1−yi) computed as
in the specification of the protocol, while in the latter, those values (in the internal
simulation) are chosen uniformly at random from G; and (4) in the former, Yao1 is
used to compute the “garbled circuit” and input-wire labels for the second-round
message from F2,P1→P2ZK to P2, while in the latter, Yao-Sim is used for that purpose,
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based on P2’s output from F(x, y), where y was obtained by S while simulating
F 1,P2→P1ZK for the first round of the protocol.
Nevertheless, we claim that Equation 4.1 holds, based on (1) the correctness
of Yao’s “garbled circuit” technique, the correctness of the oblivious transfer pro-
tocol and the enforcement of parties entering the two rounds of the protocol with
a consistent input; (2) the hardness of the DDH assumption for GroupGen; (3) the
uniformity of Ki,(1−yi), Ci,(1−yi) per πF in G; and (4) the security Yao’s construction.
We proceed with a formal proof.
Proof (of lemma). We prove the lemma by defining an intermediate sequence of
probabilistic games between the distributions in Equation 4.1 and showing that any
two subsequent games in the sequence are (at most) computationally-indistinguishable.















• F1,P2→P1ZK-pass acts precisely like F
1,P2→P1
ZK , except that for an incoming message
(ZK-prover, sid ◦ 1 ◦ P2, x̂, ŵ)
from P2 such that (x̂, ŵ) ∈ R1, it sends (ZK-proof, sid ◦ 1 ◦P2, x̂) along with ŵ
to P1 and the adversary.
• π1 is identical to πF , except that here the parties use F1,P2→P1ZK-pass (instead of
F1,P2→P1ZK ) for first-round communication originating from P2. In addition: (1)
upon receiving the first-round message
(ZK-proof, sid ◦ 1 ◦ P2, ({ūi, v̄i, w̄i}i , (G







) from F1,P2→P1ZK-pass , P1 performs the same checks as πF
instructs (on the onset of the second round), but also records y if they pass; and
(2) upon receiving the second-round message from F2,P2→P1ZK , P1 performs the
same checks as πF instructs (in the output computation phase), but outputs
F 1k (x, y) (where x is P1’s input).
We claim that GAME0 and GAME1 are identical. First, observe that the
adversary has no access to the contents of a message for P1 from either F1,P2→P1ZK
in GAME0 or from F1,P2→P1ZK-pass in GAME1, and therefore cannot tell one (not con-
taining a witness) from the other (containing the witness). The rest of the claim
follows from the correctness of the OT protocol, the correctness of Yao’s construc-
tion (cf. Section 4.1.4) and the enforcing of (the corrupted) P2 to enter both rounds
of the protocol with a consistent input. More precisely, note that the only difference
left between the executions is in the computation of P1’s output. Observe that if
the output computation phase is reached in GAME0 (resp. in GAME1), we are
guaranteed that:
1. The values {ui, vi, wi}i were constructed as specified in πF (in both games);
2. A delivered a message






from (the corrupted) P2 to F1,P2→P1ZK (resp. to F
1,P2→P1
ZK-pass ) such that





)) ∈ R1; (4.2)
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3. A delivered


























































, (G, q, g), k, {ui, vi, wi}i , {ūi, v̄i, w̄i}i))
from F2,P2→P1ZK to P1.
(The above implicitly takes into account the consistency verifications that P1 per-
forms in both πF and π1 at the onset of the second round and prior to the output
computation.)
We first note that in both executions, since for all i,
ūi = g
āi , v̄i = g
b̄i , w̄i =

gāib̄i yi = 0
gāib̄i−1 otherwise
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per Equation 4.2, and since for all i,
ūi = g
ā′i , v̄i = g












per Equation 4.3 — it must be the case that y′ = y.









′; Ω̄). Furthermore, Equation 4.3 and the proper construction of the val-
ues {ui, vi, wi}i guarantees that for any i, if xi = 0,
Z̄i
def
= K̄−bii,xi · C̄i,xi
= (u
r̄i,0





= (gair̄i,0 · gs̄i,0)−bi · (gaibir̄i,0 · gbis̄i,0 · Z̄i,0) = Z̄i,0,
and if xi = 1,
Z̄i
def
= K̄−bii,xi · C̄i,xi
= (u
r̄i,1
i · gs̄i,1)−bi · ((g · wi)r̄i,1 · v
s̄i,1
i · Z̄i,1)
= (gair̄i,1 · gs̄i,1)−bi · (gaibir̄i,1 · gbis̄i,1 · Z̄i,1) = Z̄i,1;











). In GAME1, P1 outputs F
1
k (x, y) =
F 1k (x, y
′). But by the correctness property of Yao’s construction, these are equal.












• FZK-consult mimics the input/output behavior of FZK, but is controlled by the
prover and produces an on-the-fly “proof” for a statement x̂ without ever
seeing a witness ŵ such that (x̂, ŵ) ∈ R. In particular, on a (dummy) incoming
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message (ZK-prover, sid, ·, ·), FP1→P2ZK-consult asks the prover P1 for x̂ and sends
(ZK-proof, sid, x̂) to the verifier P2 and the adversary.
• π2 is identical to π1, except that here the parties use FP1→P2ZK-consult for first-round
communication originating at P1, as follows. In the first round, P1 sends a
(dummy) message (ZK-prover, sid◦1◦P1,⊥,⊥) to FP1→P2ZK-consult. When the latter
asks for a statement to be “proven”, P1 provides:
x̂ = ({ui, vi, wi}i , (G, q, g), k)),
computed precisely as in π1. In effect, P1 in π2 provides the functionality with
the exact same statement to be proven as in π1, but without the witness.
We claim that GAME1 is identical to GAME2. To see this, note that (1)
the adversary does not have access to the contents of the first-round message from
P1 to either F1,P1→P2ZK in GAME1 or to F
P1→P2
ZK-consult in GAME2, and therefore cannot
distinguish one (with contents) from the other (with dummy contents); and (2) the
adversary cannot distinguish the outgoing message F1,P1→P2ZK produces in GAME1
from the message FP1→P2ZK-consult produces in GAME2, as they are identically distributed
(in GAME1, the message contains the statement x̂, where x̂ was provided with ŵ
such that (x̂, ŵ) ∈ R1; in GAME2, the message contains a statement computed in
the exact same way, and is therefore identically distributed). We conclude that Z













• π3 is identical to π2, except that in the first round, when F1,P1→P2ZK-consult asks P1
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for a first-round statement to be “proven”, P1 provides
x̂ = ({ui, vi, wi}i , (G, q, g), k),
where the values {ui, vi, wi}i are computed as in π2, except that P1 sets wi =
gaibi for all i (as opposed to setting wi to g
aibi when xi = 0 and to g
aibi−1 when
xi = 1, as is done in π2).
We now claim that GAME2
c
≈ GAME3. By a standard hybrid argument,







































• πj2 is identical to π2, aside from the following. Let i1, . . . ij be the first j
coordinates on which x, the input to P1, is equal to 1. When FP1→P2ZK-consult asks
P1 for a first-round statement to be “proven”, P1 provides
x̂ = ({ui, vi, wi}i , (G, q, g), k),
where the values {ui, vi, wi}i are computed as in π2, except that for any ` ∈





≈ GAMEi∗2 by the hardness of the DDH problem for GroupGen.
Specifically, assume Z,A attempt to distinguish the said games; we construct an al-
gorithm D that attacks the hardness of the DDH problem for GroupGen. Algorithm
D on input (k, z,G, q, g, u, v, w) sets an internal (simulated) CRS to (G, q, g). It then






ZK and an honest P1 running π
(i∗−1)
2 in a straightforward man-
ner, with the following caveat:
• In the simulation of FP1→P2ZK-consult, when F
P1→P2
ZK-consult asks (the simulated) P1 for a
first-round statement to be “proven”, D provides
x̂ = ({ui, vi, wi}i , (G, q, g), k),
where the values {ui, vi, wi}i are computed precisely as in π
(i∗−1)
2 for all i,
except for the i∗’s coordinate on which x is 1; call this coordinate ii∗ . For this
coordinate, D sets uii∗ = u, vii∗ = v, wii∗ = w (recall that u, v, w are inputs to
D).
D outputs whatever Z outputs at the end of the simulation. Note that
(G, q, g) R← GroupGen(k); a, b R← Zq :

















(G, q, g) R← GroupGen(k); a, b R← Zq :

































• FP1→P2ZK-consult[i] is an instance of F
P1→P2
ZK-consult, as defined in GAME2; here we use
two distinct instances of the same functionality.
• π4 is identical to π3 (in particular, uses instance FP1→P2ZK-consult[1] for first-round
communication originating at P1, as before), except that the parties here use
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FP1→P2ZK-consult[2] for second-round communication originating at P1, as follows. In
the second round, P1 sends a (dummy) message (ZK-prover, sid ◦ 2 ◦ P1,⊥,⊥)
to FP1→P2ZK-consult[2]. When the latter asks for a statement to be “proven”, P1
provides:
x̂ = (Circuit, {Ki,σ, Ci,σ}i,σ , (G, q, g), k, {ūi, v̄i, w̄i}i , {ui, vi, wi}),
where all the above are computed exactly as in π3. In effect, P1 in π4 provides
the functionality with the exact same second-round statement to be proven as
in π3, but without the witness.
We claim that GAME3 is identical to GAME4. To see this, note that (1) the
adversary does not have access to the contents of the second-round message from P1
to either F2,P1→P2ZK in GAME3 or to F
P1→P2
ZK-consult[2] in GAME4, and therefore cannot
distinguish one (with contents) from the other (with dummy contents); and (2) the
adversary cannot distinguish the outgoing message F2,P1→P2ZK produces in GAME3
from the message FP1→P2ZK-consult[2] produces in GAME4, as they are identically dis-
tributed (in GAME3, the message contains the statement x̂, where x̂ was provided
with ŵ such that (x̂, ŵ) ∈ R2; in GAME4, the message contains a statement com-
puted in the exact same way, and is therefore identically distributed). We conclude













• π5 is identical to π4, except that after receiving (and testing) first-round mes-
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sage






) from F1,P2→P1ZK-pass , and upon being asked by F
P1→P2
ZK-consult[2]
for a second-round statement, P1 provides FP1→P2ZK-consult[2] with
x̂2 = (Circuit, {Ki,σ, Ci,σ}i,σ , (G, q, g), k, {ūi, v̄i, w̄i}i , {ui, vi, wi}i),
where all the components of x̂2 are computed precisely as in π4, except that
P1, for every i, sets Ki,1−yi , Ci,1−yi to be elements chosen uniformly at random
from G.
We claim that GAME4 is identical to GAME5. We first note that in both









āib̄i + 1 yi = 0
āib̄i − 1 otherwise
6= āib̄i.
We claim that for for any ā, b̄, c̄, Z ∈ G such that c̄ 6= āb̄, the group elements
K
def
= gār+s and C
def
= gc̄r+b̄s ·Z are independent and uniformly distributed in G when
r, s are picked uniformly at random from G. To see this, fix some α, β ∈ G, and
consider the following system of equations in r, s: gār+s = α
gc̄r+b̄s · Z = β
 .
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Rearranging, we have:  ār + s = logg α
c̄r + b̄s = logg β − logg Z
 ,











. Note that det(B) = āb̄− c̄ 6= 0 when c̄ 6= āb̄. Therefore, the
system has a unique solution in r, s for each choice of α, β. It follows that when r, s
are chosen uniformly at random from G, α = K and β = C are uniformly distributed
in G.
Therefore, the adversary cannot distinguish the output message produced by
FP1→P2ZK-consult[2] in GAME4, where the {Ki,1−yi , Ci,1−yi}i are computed as in π4, from the
output message produced by FP1→P2ZK-consult[2] in GAME5, where the {Ki,1−yi , Ci,1−yi}i














• π6 is identical to π5, except that when P1 is asked by FP1→P2ZK-consult[2] for a second-
round statement, P1 computes v ← F2k (x, y), computes (Circuit, {Zi}i)
R←
Yao-Sim(k,F2k , y, v), and sets Zi,yi = Zi for every i; it continues preparing the
statement as in π5.
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It is straightforward to show that GAME5
c
≈ GAME6 based on the security of Yao’s
garbled circuit (cf. Section 4.1.4).
GAME7. Finally, note that GAME6 is identical to GAME7
def
= IDEALF ,S,Z . This is
so, because the differences between the executions are conceptual: in the former, P1
computes F2k (x, y) by itself, while in the latter it receives it from F ; in the former,
P1 computes F
1
k (x, y) itself, while in the latter P̃1 receives it from F ; in addition,







while in the latter S perfectly simulates these functionalities. We conclude that
EXECFZKπF ,A,Z
c
≈ IDEALF ,S,Z as required.
4.2.3 Round Optimality
It is almost immediate that two rounds are necessary for two-party computa-
tion, even if both parties are allowed to speak simultaneously, under any reasonable
definition of security. Loosely speaking, consider a candidate single-round protocol
for a functionality that provides output to one of the parties, say P2. Since (an
honest) P1 sends its message independently of P2’s input, P2 can (honestly) run
its output-computation segment of the protocol on the incoming message multiple
times using inputs of its choice, and learn the output of the functionality on each.
This clearly violates security except for functionalities that do not depend on P2’s
input.
More formally and in the context of UC security, consider the functionality
F=, which on input a pair of two-bit strings x, y ∈ {0, 1}2, provides P2 with output
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1 if x = y, 0 otherwise. Assume π UC-realizes F= in a single round. Let πP1 be
the procedure in π that takes P1’s input x and a security parameter k and outputs
P1’s outgoing message m; let π
P2 be the procedure in π that takes P2’s input y,
an incoming message m and a security parameter k, and computes P2’s output
value v. As π UC-realizes F=, it must be the case that for any x, y and with all but
negligible probability in k, if m
R← πP1(x, k) and v R← πP2(y,m, k), then v = F=(x, y)
(by considering a benign adversary that does not corrupt any party and delivers all
messages as prescribed by π).
Consider an environment Z which picks x uniformly at random from {0, 1}2
and provides x as input to P1. Consider an adversary A, participating in a real-life
execution of π, that acts as follows. A corrupts P2 on the onset of the execution.
On an incoming message m from P1, A computes πP2(y,m, k) on all four strings
y ∈ {0, 1}2, and outputs (the lexicographically first) y on which the computation
produces 1. Note that by the above, with all but negligible probability, A outputs
x. We claim that for any ideal-process adversary S, Z may distinguish a real-life
execution of π in the presence of A from the ideal process involving S and F=. To
see this, observe that S’s probability of outputting x is at most 1/4, as its view in
the ideal process is independent of x.
For the setting in which parties need to take turns in sending their protocol
messages, note that a two-round protocol that provides output to both participating
parties implies a one-round protocol that provides output to one. Proceed with the
argument above to obtain that three rounds are necessary for this setting.
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4.3 Application to Universally-Composable Blind Signatures
In this section, we briefly discuss how the simpler of our protocols can be used
to construct a round-optimal (i.e., two-round) UC-secure blind signature scheme in
the CRS model. We begin with a quick recap of the definitions. Roughly speaking,
a blind signature scheme should guarantee unforgeability and blindness. The first
property requires that if a malicious user interacts with the honest signer for a total
of ` executions of the protocol (in an arbitrarily-interleaved fashion), then the user
should be unable to output valid signatures on `+ 1 distinct messages. (A stronger
requirement called strong unforgeability requires that the user cannot even output
`+ 1 distinct signatures on `+ 1 possibly-repeating messages.) Blindness requires,
very informally, that a malicious signer cannot “link” a particular execution of the
protocol to a particular user even after observing the signature obtained by the user.
This is formalized (see, e.g., [Fis06]) by a game in which the signer interacts with
two users in an order determined by a randomly-chosen selector bit b, and should
be unable to guess the value of b (with probability significantly better than 1/2)
even after being given the signatures computed by these two users. This definition
also allows the malicious signer to generate its public key in any manner (and not
necessarily following the legitimate key-generation algorithm).
The above represent the “classical” definitions of security for blind signatures.
Fischlin [Fis06] formally defines a blind signature functionality in the UC framework.
He also gives a two-round protocol realizing this functionality. Interestingly, one of
the motivations cited in [Fis06] for not relying on the generic results of [CLOS02] is
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the desire to obtain a round-optimal protocol.
Assume we have a (standard) signature scheme (Gen, Sign,Vrfy), and consider
the (randomized) functionality Fsign(SK,m) = SignSK(m). Contrary to what might
be a naive first impression, secure computation of this functionality does not (in
general) yield a secure blind signature scheme! (See also [JLO97].) Specifically,
the problem is that the signer may use different secret keys SK, SK ′ in different
executions of the protocol. Furthermore, the public key may be set up in such a way
that each secret key yields a valid signature. Then, upon observing the signatures
computed by the users, the signer may be able to tell which key was used to generate
each signature, thereby violating the users’ anonymity.
Juels, Luby, and Ostrovsky [JLO97] suggest a relatively complex method for
handling this issue. We observe that a much simpler solution is possible by simply
forcing the signer to use a fixed signing key in every execution of the protocol. This is
done in the following way: To generate a public/secret key, the signer first computes
(PK, SK) ← Gen(1k). It then computes a (perfectly-binding) commitment com =
Com(SK;ω) to SK using randomness ω. The public key is PK, com and the secret
key contains SK and ω.
Define functionality F∗sign ((SK, ω), (com,m)) as follows: if Com(SK;ω) =
com, then the second party receives output SignSK(m) (when Sign is randomized,
the functionality chooses a uniform random tape for computing this signature). Oth-
erwise, the second party receives output ⊥. The first party receives no output in
either case.
It is not hard to see that a protocol for secure computation of F∗sign yields a
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secure blind signature scheme; using a UC two-party computation protocol for F∗sign
gives a UC blind signature scheme. Using the simple two-round protocol constructed
in Section 4.2.1, and noticing that only one party receives output here, we thus
obtain a two-round UC blind signature scheme.
4.4 Application to Evaluation of Trust Policies on Sets of Credentials
Trust establishment between a server and a client typically involves an in-
teraction that enables the server to evaluate his policy on a subset of the client’s
credentials. It is often desirable that the interaction provide privacy guarantees to
the participating parties. In rough terms, a procedure that limits the amount of
information disclosed to the client about the server’s policy is said to provide server
privacy guarantees; similarly, a procedure that limits the amount of information
disclosed to the server about the client’s credentials is said to provide client privacy
guarantees.
Note that the evaluation of a server’s policy on a client’s set of credentials
can be cast as an instance of two-party computation (by having the policy as the
server’s input, the credentials as the client’s, and the functionality a circuit that
evaluates one on the other). Applying our main construction yields a solution that
provides full privacy guarantees to both the client and the server in a minimal
number of rounds while preserving security under general composition. On the
down side, the approach may entail relatively high communication complexity, as a
circuit encoding the verification of cryptographic credentials — to be garbled and
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sent per our construction — may be of large size. In this section, we briefly compare
this approach to other solutions suggested in the literature.
Trust-Negotiation. In the trust-negotiation setting, the server and the client
both maintain policies that regulate access to their resources (be it credentials or
the policies themselves). Trust-negotiation techniques (see [BS00, SWY01, YWS01,
YW03, WL04] and references therein) involve strategies for the gradual disclosure
of the resources, such that no resource is revealed unless its access-control policy has
been satisfied. Resources that are cleared are fully disclosed, and so these techniques
do not provide full privacy guarantees to either party.
Hidden Credentials. Hidden Credential schemes [HBS03, BHS04] allow a client
to decrypt an encrypted server resource when the client holds credentials that sat-
isfy the server’s access-policy; the credentials are never revealed to the server (in
fact, the server never learns whether access to the resource has been granted or not).
The schemes thus provide full client-privacy. However, the client may learn informa-
tion about the structure of the access policy (expressed as a boolean formula with
threshold gates, in the most general case), even if its credentials do not satisfy it.
The schemes therefore provide only partial server-privacy. Specifying policies that
ask for a credential attribute to fall within a range of values is inefficient in current
Hidden Credential schemes. The schemes are based on Identity-Based Encryption
(IBE) (see [BF03] and references therein), consider the problem in a stand-alone
setting, are proven secure in Random Oracle (RO) model and are communication-
and round efficient.
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Oblivious Envelopes. Oblivious Envelopes allow a client to decrypt an encrypted
server resource when the client holds a credential that attests to its compliance
with an agreed upon, public policy (as such, the schemes offer no server privacy
guarantees); as in Hidden Credential schemes, the server is oblivious to the client’s
access attempts — the schemes provide full client privacy. Signature-based con-
structions [LDB03, NT05] allow the use of general policies (expressed as boolean
circuits). A construction based on Pederson commitments [LL05a] only allows for
simple policies that may compare an attribute in a credential to specified values. An
improved construction based on integer commitments [LL06] allows the (efficient)
use of any predicate for which an (efficient) zero-knowledge proof system exists. All
the above constructions consider the problem in the stand-alone setting, are proven
secure in the RO model and are communication- and round efficient.
Policy-Based Encryption. Policy-Based Encryption schemes [BM05, BMC06]
allow a server, holding a resource and a corresponding public access-control policy, to
encrypt the resource such that only a client holding credentials that satisfy the policy
may decrypt it. As in Oblivious Envelopes, the schemes provide full client privacy
and no server privacy. The constructions allow the use of general policies (expressed
as monotone boolean formulae), are based on bilinear-pairings over elliptic curves,
are considered in the stand-alone setting, proven secure in the RO model and are
communication- and round efficient.
Solutions Based on Generic Secure Two-Party Computation Protocols.
Casting the problem as an instance of secure two-party computation, one may use
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generic protocols to obtain solutions that provide full server and client privacy,
but entail a relatively high communication complexity. Specifically, in the stand-
alone setting, applying the protocol of Katz and Yung [KO04] gives a five-round
solution based on general assumptions; while applying the protocol of Cachin et.
al. [CCKM00] gives a three-round solution based on the DDH assumption and the
availability of a CRS in the network. In the UC setting and under the CRS assump-
tion, applying the protocol of Canetti et. al. [CLOS02] gives a non-constant round
solution secure against adaptive adversaries; applying the protocol of Jarecki and
Shmatikov [JS07] yields a five-round solution (three-round, if one further assumes
the RO model) based on the strong RSA and the Decisional Composite Residuos-
ity (DCR) assumptions, secure against static corruption. (All the constant-rounds
solutions above may save a round of communication if only the server is to receive
output.)
Improving the Efficiency of Solutions Based on Generic Secure Two-Party
Computation Protocols. Several solutions aim at reducing the high communica-
tion complexity incurred when applying generic secure two-party computation pro-
tocols to our problem by removing credential verification from the two-party func-
tionality to be computed and dealing with it separately. All consider the problem
in the stand-alone setting. Certified Input Private Policy Evaluation [LL05b] relies
on commitment-based certificates; it provides full server privacy against malicious
adversaries, but full client privacy only for weak-honest adversaries (for malicious
adversaries, some client information is leaked; leakage is detectable). A similar solu-
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tion based on IBE certificates is given in [FAL06]. Both solutions are round efficient
and offer improved communication complexity as compared with solutions based on
generic secure two-party computation protocols. The protocol proposed in [FLA06]
aims at providing a full trust negotiation mechanism with full privacy guarantees
to both participating parties. The solution is based on IBE certificates and homeo-
morphic encryption and offers improved communication efficiency as compared with
solutions based on generic secure two-party computation. However, round complex-
ity is proportional to the sizes of the credential sets held by the parties.
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